Concert Of Europe And The Balance Of Power In World War I

Research Question

Discuss about the Modern History for Battle of the Nations.

Following the fall of Napoleon from the catastrophic retreat from Russia to the Battle of the Nations, he chose to surrender to the allies. Prussia, Great Britain, Russia, and Austria came together in 1814 to discuss what should happen to France (Snyder, 2002). The general mood was that this nation must remain intact so as to maintain the balance of power in Europe. My interest in this particular topic is to elaborate on the Concert of Europe as well as the causes of World War I. I am also interested in finding out the various contributions of the balance of power in World War I. Therefore, my research question that I will try to answer as I carry out my research will be, “What was the contribution of balance of power in World War I?”

In this research study, a possible hypothesis to the relevance of the cause of the First World War might be changes in the balance of power during Napoleon’s reign eventually resulted in World War I since it was difficult for one country to dominate Europe.

I will test or falsify my hypothesis by looking at the Independent Variables that have relevance for the Dependent Variables. For this particular topic, the Independent Variables include judgment of leaders, economic authority, offensive capabilities and decline of empires. These are relevant to my chosen hypothesis which represents the Dependent Variables.

I intend to carry out my research by using the Internet, and information from peer reviewed and academic journal articles. I will also use information found at the University Learning Resource Centre library.

The Concert of Europe was the equilibrium of power that was present in Europe starting with the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte up to the emergence of the First World War (Steiner, 2005). The founding leaders included Austria, the United Kingdom, Prussia, and Russia. These were also affiliates of the 6^th Coalition accountable for the decline of Napoleon I. During this time, France managed to establish itself as a fifth member of this particular alliance. Among the leading members of the system were British international Secretary Lord Castlereagh, the Tsar of Russia Alexander I, and Austrian Chancellor Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich (Manila, 2007). Also referred to as the Congress System, the Concert of Europe was an outcome of a tradition taken on by the ancient great authorities of Europe of meeting often in an International Conference to strategize a solution by joint agreement. This took place whenever an issue arose that was seen as a threat to peace between European countries. Surprisingly, the Concert did not have real liability and stood for European interests, not those of the non-European or colonized states.

Hypothesis

Notably, war was not absurd for the Concert of Europe, as long as it occurred outside Europe. The leaders in charge within the Congress System aimed at containing France after years of war.  They also wanted to attain a balance of power between Europe’s great authorities while upholding the defensive preparations made at the Congress of Vienna between 1814 and 1815 (Darwin, 2009).  The Concert of Europe’s leaders wanted to prevent the rise of another Napoleon personality which would lead to an additional continent-wide war. Initially, the idea of the Concert was suggested by the Austrian Chancellor, Kaunitz. At the time, the fear of revolution was quite high to the extent of European powers not resting contended until they had come up with some means to safeguard the intransience of Vienna Settlement. The meetings that were to be held, focused on the dialogue of measures that would be judged to be most helpful for the success and repose of the countries, together with the preservation of peace of Europe (Snyder, 2002).

Under the leadership and guidance of the Austrian Chancellor, the Quadruple Alliance as it came to be recognized eventually established a dictatorship of the Powers. However, after holding at least four meetings, the Concert broke up in 1823. During the first meeting of the Concert at Aix-la-Chapelle, the Austrian Chancellor remarked that it symbolized the pinnacle of the structure by which the united Powers would set up a joint control over the dealings of all global states. Notably, Napoleon had also previously forwarded his own plan for the welfare of Europe (Legro & Moravcsik, 2000). There was a difference of opinion between England and Austria, and Russia regarding the foundation on which France was to be let into the ‘club’. While Russia proposed that it be admitted by adhering to the principles of the Holy Alliance, England and Austria felt that France should be admitted through a treaty alliance with the 4 Powers and that was done (Thomas, 2008). In order to please Czar Alexander, a powerful declaration was issued with regards to the objectives and purpose of the honorable pentarchy. The rights of the people were to be strictly observed, the arts of peace were to be safeguarded, the wealth of the state increased, and the sentiments of religion and morality awakened. This was to be done as an example of concord and justice.

In the course of the meetings, the King of Sweden was called upon by the Congress to provide explanations as to why he had overlooked the agreement rights concerning Denmark and Norway (Steiner, 2005). The leader of Monaco was also ordered to advance the executive system of his nation. The Congress addressed the issue of the unclear succession to the Duchy of Baden, and discussed the status of the Jewish citizens in Russia and Austria. Soon enough, certain differences arose among the leaders, differences which increased with the course of time. These were due to the differing interests and joint jealousy of the leaders concerned. With regards to the issue of Barbary pirate in the Mediterranean Sea, the Czar cited that there should be a foreign navy fleet to monitor the waters while stamping out pirates especially in that region. Castlereagh greatly opposed this because he suspected presence of Russian war ships in the Mediterranean Sea (Manila, 2007). Additionally, Fredrick William of Prussia proposed that an allied army commanded by Wellington of Britain be permanently positioned at Belgium in order to suppress any revolutions anywhere in Europe. Castlereagh refused for fear that Britain might be dragged into any war which other powers thought necessary. The congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was followed by a period of unrest progression in Europe. Not only was there a revolution in Sicily and Naples against Ferdinand I, king of Naples, but also disturbances in Germany.  By 1827, the Congress System which had been established by the great Powers to solve European issues that came as a result of Napoleonic wars and the French Revolution failed to attain its goals.

Research Design

The British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, declined to consent to any offer either to bring colonies back under Spain or even intercede between them and Spain unless British wellbeing in those settlements were protected beforehand (Darwin, 2009). As a way of suppressing slave trade, Great Britain recommended that European states work out a joint right of search for slaves. This was however not acknowledged on the basis of the jealousy of the naval power of Great Britain. Furthermore, no nation was ready to tolerate such intrusion with the trade. It was finally decided that no action could be in use against slavery.  It is maintained that a global guarantee of the status quo would have led to the organized suppression of constitutionalism, tolerance and nationalism in Europe. The declaration would have also acted as a campaign against the progressive forces of Europe, thus proving lethal to her dominance in the world (Snyder, 2002). Moreover, there would have been no alliance of Germany and Italy. It would also have been quite difficult to divide Holland and Belgium in spite of the complaints of the latter. The main query was whether or not the Powers had any right to interfere in the inside affairs of a State simply on the basis of the status quo being upset in a certain nation.

The British position was that she was not ready to embrace the universal code of international authority. However, she was ready to consider partly the involvement whenever an emergency came up in any nation. This nation refused the notion that the joint force of the Allies was to be prostituted in support of the reputable order without any thought of the extent to which it was abused (Legro & Moravcsik, 2000). According to Castlereagh, the Alliance was never aimed at the union of worldwide governments or suppression of revolutionary campaigns in every corner of Europe regardless of their values. The over-extension of rival empires such as the Moguls, East Asian empires, or Ottomans, resulted in decentralization which spurred competition and innovation. Following numerous revolutions in 1848, the government sought more centrality and anchoring of everything around the Vienna capital. In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian compromise established the two as a dual monarchy. However, this system together with its many constituent nationalities collapsed with World War I (Thomas, 2008).

As much as possible, the Congress of Vienna returned control to the conventional ruling houses of Europe such as the Habsburgs, and the Bourbons. In order to prevent any single nation from attempting to control all of Europe as France had done under Napoleon Bonaparte, the Congress insisted on a balance of power. Nations such as Prussia, Austria, and Russia would have considerable strength. 1870 to 1914 witnessed a Europe that was significantly more firm than that of previous years. This was as a result of the establishment of novel states in Italy and Germany, combined with opinionated reformations in older, developed states such as Austria and Britain (Steiner, 2005). Coupled with scientific progressions of the Industrial Revolution, this internal stability meant that European states were ever more capable and eager to chase political powers internationally. When the worth of these novel technologies became evident, the states of Europe started taking control of large swathes of land in Asia and Africa, introducing a novel era of imperialism.

Research Findings – Variable #1: Judgment of Leaders

The notion of a German state had survived since the establishment of the Kingdom of Germany in the early middle Ages. The commencement of popular nationalism in Germany has its roots in Napoleon’s invasion of the German land in 1806 (Manila, 2007). Napoleon’s political machinations encouraged nationalist feelings. Furthermore, most German leaders understood that there was potency in collaborating together. Such an acceptance was to result to inter-state cooperation across the area, the most noteworthy illustration being the Zollverein. This referred to customs union that constituted most of northern Germany by the early 1830s (Darwin, 2009). Both economic and nationalistic factors were taken advantage of by the conventional King of Prussia, William I and his head minister, Otto von Bismarck. These two individuals understood the worth of a unified German state, particularly one that did not include Austrian influence.

Tsar Alexander II came to supremacy by using the overpowering in the Crimean War as the key momentum to reform. According to him, Russia needed to adhere to the European representation so as to grow to be more influential. Alexander II would eventually end the covert police started by Nicholas I and establish public trials that had expert judges with state salaries and juries (Snyder, 2002). Local provincial councils known as Zemstvos were also established and elected by the people. They addressed local government issues such as educational institutions and roads. Despite such moves by Alexander II, unrest still continued in Russia. In 1860, Russians established the city of Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean and started constructing the Trans-Siberian railroad that would link the East to the West. With regards to Japan, it modeled European militarism and industrialization during this period to increase its concentration on China and gain dominance over Korea. It is this expansion that helped cause World War I, marking the first major triumph of a non-Western authority over a Western one (Legro & Moravcsik, 2000).  

The Concert of Europe’s main achievement was the safeguarding of sovereignty for Greece and Belgium by 1831. In 1840, the authorities except France arbitrated in defense of the Ottoman Empire to end Egypt’s 8-year occupation of Syria (Thomas, 2008).  The pattern of cooperative behavior witnessed in the Concert of Europe during early 19^th Century is as a result of a commitment to uphold the settlement, which hinged on the integrity of enforcement threats and an allotment of advantages corresponding with military capabilities. The balance was self-enforcing in that powers that could oppose an alteration of the system had incentives to do so, while those that could upset it did not have incentives to do so (Steiner, 2005).  Notably, offensive realists would see any Concert as being at best short-lived. However, constructivists and neorealists would cite that potential balancing of power, multilateral organizations and normative values would award more flexibility within the Concert so as to accommodate transforming conditions and power uniformities. Defensive practicality offers a better record of the Concert of Europe because it merges structural pragmatism with non-realist theories of state inclinations (Manila, 2007).

Research Findings – Variable #2: Economic Authority

A school of thought recognized as offensive practicality argues that foreign chaos tends to drive states to enlarge whenever a chance presents itself. This is to say that there is no status quo authorities in the foreign structure, save for the rare hegemon that desires to preserve its controlling status over likely rivals. So far, it has been established that the Concert of Europe’s associates were actually good defensive realists. However, they reacted to structural limitations as they did mainly because their local administrations and leaders were moderate and cautious.  Notably, most powers are too weak to make a run for regional hegemony, but still act impolitely to gather as much control as they can since states are more or less always better off with more rather than less authority (Darwin, 2009). Making latent and definite military authority criteria for being a great power usually means not including some states that impose moderation. A number of researchers consider Prussia an immense power throughout the 19^th Century, but is only recognized when Otto van Bismarck takes control. Moreover, postwar West Germany is also left out because it did not have the military power to contend with the superpowers. However, this was simply because Western occupation prohibited it from doing so.

Concerts are considered to be providers of an insurance policy or the guarantors of last resort, capable of defending minimum standards of the order in foreign society of states. They also design specific agreements to maximize the welfare of their members together with the larger system on whose behalf they operate. Concerts have the luxury of searching for lost opportunities to establish an optimum world (Snyder, 2002). With reference to the Concert of Europe, given that the defeated ex-hegemons are at their point of maximum relative weakness immediately after the war, but benefit relatively afterward, their offensive capabilities, unifying fear and concert cooperation eventually increased over time. Whether or not collective security can work in the novel Europe is a critical issue which underlies much contemporary discussion over how to react to the waning of the Cold War. It is argued that many of the causes of war that produced conflict in the course of the first half of the 20^th Century have either been terminated or substantially moderated. Despite this, it is clear that those involved in the Concert of Europe had specific strategies as to how to conquer their targeted territories.

The demise of the Concert of Europe was a rather slow process where demands for revision of Vienna’s frontiers along national lines deteriorated it. Italians and Germans wanted to combine their small states, while parts of the Austrian Empire wanted autonomy. The Concert was further weakened by consecutive wars between participants which it was meant to bar the Crimean War of 1854 – 1856, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Italian War of Independence of 1859, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 – 1871 (Legro & Moravcsik, 2000).  The British Foreign Minister Lord Edward Grey made all efforts to convene the Concert of Europe to prevent the First World War but was unsuccessful. Some historians have described the Concert as being the opposite of a foreign organization that is demanding to work within the boundaries of international law since it did not have a secretariat or rules of behavior.  It was through this particular letdown that made Lord Grey and others more strong-minded to set up a body which could call a meeting of key powers at little notice to try and stop war. This is what developed into the League of Nations. The fact that the Concert of Europe lacked an official mechanism meant that the novel body would include one, and affiliate states would entrust themselves to its agreement which included acceptance of rules not to resort to war (Thomas, 2008).

The enormous Powers were combating each other for state interests and had refused to negotiate to maintain peace, one of Metternich’s main objectives for Europe. The grounds of the Crimean War were also different from the standards of the Concert of Europe because Russia wanted to take lead of the fast deteriorating Ottoman Empire (Steiner, 2005). Initially, Metternich aimed at preventing any country from gaining absolute control of this particular Empire, thus obliterating the balance of power. It is assume that World War I was quite significant in that it heralded the conclusion of empires and the introduction of novel nation-states. Yet, in August 1914, none had the least notion that the War would be long or even significant (Manila, 2007). Notably, it was not before 3 long years of war of erosion that empires, starting with the Russian one, would eventually start to fall apart. To suggest that Europe was in a sate of shock following Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and Austria in 1806 would be an understatement. At the time, it appeared that the normal order of things had been shifted on its head. Soon after the collapse of Napoleon’s empire in 1814, the great Power settled down to the job of redefining the political system, giving birth to the Concert of Europe.

World War I witnessed the majestic empires of Britain and France mobilized to assist imperial war and European efforts. The War also set free an unparalleled ideological challenge to colonial rule which was embodied in the notions of Woodrow Wilson taking the form through the mandatory system (Darwin, 2009). Even though Britain came out triumphant from World War I, its empire was far from safe. It had been required to pull back from the majority of its martial pledges around the peripheries of the former Tsarist Empire, withdraw from Turkey, and agree to a novel legitimate settlement in Egypt which reduced its political power. Nonetheless, colonial empires had attained a tipping peak in the early 1920s. Conquering and triumph of the total wars of the 20^th Century were of great importance. Combat zone crush for the Ottomans, Russians, and Germans together with resultant revolutions and interior political disintegration guaranteed that their pre-war imperial lands would undergo a form of decolonization in the conflict’s aftermath (Snyder, 2002).

What has the research revealed about the variables chosen as a method to test the hypothesis?

With regards to the variables chosen as a method to test the hypothesis, this research has revealed that the great Powers acted so as to contain the violence and prevent the emergence of a general conflict (Legro & Moravcsik, 2000). Additionally, the Crimean War was fashioned to destroy Russia sea power.

Are the variables relevant?

Yes, the variables are relevant.

How so and what is their importance in proving the hypothesis?

The variables are relevant in that they provide literal facts concerning the subject matter and prove the hypothesis that changes in the balance of power during Napoleon’s reign eventually led to World War I since it was difficult for one country to dominate the whole of Europe.

Conclusion

With the end of the First World War, many argued that NATO and other Cold War security organizations were becoming less significant to the West’s security. This prompted various analysts to look back to the early 19^th Century Concert of Europe as a representation for addressing security issues. Furthermore, foreign relations theorists have also used this Concert to establish theories about security organizations for many years. The Concert of Europe was a key diplomatic evolution which institutionalized the practice of meeting together for crisis management. Theoretically, a greater flow of information means more transparency. With this in mind, I believe that the variables discussed above have proved my hypothesis. It was difficult for one nation to have complete control over Europe and differences emerging from such disagreements resulted to World War I. 

References

Darwin, J. (2009). The empire project: The rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830 – 1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Legro, J.W., & Moravcsik, A. (2000). “Correspondence: Brother can you spare a paradigm? (Or, was anybody ever a realist?).” International Security, 25. Pp. 188 – 191.

Manila, E. (2007). The Wilsonian moment: Self-determination and the international origins of anticolonial nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Snyder, G.H. (2002). “Mearsheimer’s world: Offensive realism and the struggle for security.” International Security, 27. Pp. 161.

Steiner, Z. (2005). The lights that failed: European international history, 1919 – 1933. New York: Oxford University Press.

Thomas, M. (2008). Empires of intelligence: Security services and colonial disorder after 1914. Berkeley: University of California Press.