Effect of Gender Quotas on Female Underrepresentation

To what extent do
gender quotas solve the problem of women’s
underrepresentation?

Gender quotas within the political sphere are defined by Bacchi, as “a form of affirmative action, aimed at increasing women’s representation in elected legislative bodies” (2006, 32). The three most popular types of quota used are voluntary party quotas, legislated candidate quotas and legislated reserved seats (IDEA, 2013). Voluntary party quotas refer to certain political parties setting up a quota to “guarantee the nomination of a certain number or proportion of women” (Chen, 2010), as seen in countries such as Sweden or the UK. This differs to the likes of legislated candidate quotas in which the constitution or party law governs the minimum percentage of women candidates, as seen in the case of Ireland, Belgium or France. Lastly, legislated reserved seats, which directly refer to the number of seats which women are to take up within a parliament; although it is the least common type of quota used, 36 countries adopt this system and range from the likes of Tanzania to Rwanda to Pakistan (IDEA, 2013).

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It is undeniable that the use of quotas has increased significantly since the Fourth World Conference for Women in Beijing in 1995; which aimed to tackle the disparities in women’s access to political decision making within power structures (Dahlerup & Friedanvall, 2008). However, the question as to whether they solve the problem of underrepresentation still remains. Representation itself can be defined in descriptive terms, referencing the overall proportion of women in the political sphere; or it could be substantive, referring to women politicians acting explicitly for women’s interests. In most cases, quotas are seen to be “measures that target gender bias in the candidate selection process, with the goal of increasing women’s descriptive representation” (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). The assumption being that these women will act in the interests of women. However, it must be noted that the descriptive representation of women in Parliaments does not necessarily translate into substantive representation or even effective descriptive representation; often there are a wide variety of factors which influence representation outside of quotas. This can be in the form of institutional factors such as the electoral system that is already in place. In addition to this, socio-cultural values regarding the place of women in society, and contradictory issues such as the mandate effect or the label effect all impact on how quota women are perceived, thereby limiting their effectiveness. As well as this, design and implementation factors are massively influential in determining the success of quotas and how they merge with the current electoral system; this can be seen through the differences between PR and majoritarian system as well as the effectiveness of enforcement methods used for non-complying parties. As a result of this, the extent of which quotas solve the problem of women’s underrepresentation is limited, as their success is largely reliant on additional factors; proving that the use of quotas alone is not enough to solve problems surrounding underrepresentation, both in descriptive and substantive terms.

The increased use of quotas
is a response to the UN Fourth Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995, which
highlighted that at the time, only 10% of seats in national legislatures were
being held by women, with a lower percentage holding ministerial seats (UN,
1995). Quotas are now targeted to improving the descriptive representation of
women within politics (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). This refers to
improving the numbers of women in Parliaments in the hope that this will evolve
into a ‘critical mass’ which will help to determine public policy outcomes.
This is highlighted by the likes of Lovenduski who argued that “when a group
reaches a certain size, critical mass theory suggests that there will be a
qualitative change in the nature of group interactions, as the minority starts
to assert itself and thereby transform the institutional culture, norms and
values.” (2005, 142) Therefore, by improving the descriptive representation of
women in politics, it will automatically translate into a change of attitudes,
culture and policy outcomes, which will assist in an increase in policy
outcomes benefitting women, therefore positively increasing substantive
representation. However, whilst quotas are often successful in improving the
descriptive representation of women as seen in Latin America, in which Mexico,
Nicaragua, Argentina and Bolivia are all in the top twenty countries for
women’s representation in Parliament (IPU,2017). This descriptive
representation has not translated into effective substantive representation, in
which women policy makers will act in such a way that will benefit women
constituents.  An interesting case study
from this perspective is Argentina, which despite its strong descriptive representation
at 38.9% (IPU, 2017) lacks a strong substantive representation, in which many
of the bills that have been introduced which positively impact women are not
passed. Henceforth, despite the fact that women within government are trying to
act on the substantive interests of women, on the basis that the introduction
of bills surrounding sexual harassment and reproductive rights increased
cumulatively as descriptive representation increased (Franceschet &
Piscopo, 2008). It must be noted that there is a difference between the
introduction of bills and the policy outcomes as these bills were very rarely
followed through. This is because outside factors are hugely influential in
determining the policies that are passed in the Argentinian government. Some of
these factors are reflected in informal institutional practices such as work
times, location of strategy meetings and most importantly, the attitudes
towards women attending meetings. This highlights an innate double standard,
observed by Franceschet and Piscopo who reported that ‘If they (women) skip the
meeting, they are treated as uncommitted to their work and thus lose
professional respect. If they attend, however, they are considered more
sexually freewheeling, and thus lose personal respect.” (2008). Because of
these factors, women parliamentarians find it increasingly difficult to
establish a substantive presence. These misunderstandings regarding the impact
that descriptive representation has on substantive representation is also seen
in Uganda. Although women hold a critical minority in Parliament at 34% (World
Bank, 2017), there are a wide variety of outside factors which deter
substantive representation greatly. One of the most important factors is party
patronisation, which “divides women and hinders their ability to strengthen
their substantive representation” (Barenzi, 2014). In addition to this, many
women feel that they are motivated more by party loyalties than through the
promotion of women’s interests with one MP stating: “we are not strong enough
on the ground because we are also still learning and therefore you feel right
at the back of the political party, therefore you must follow all the do’s and
don’ts” (Barenzi, 2014). This links back to the issues surrounding critical
mass theory and quotas, as despite the ‘critical mass’ figure being met, women
don’t feel as if they can fully represent the interests of women without
further stigmatisation, proving that additional factors are extremely
influential in helping or hindering women’s representation despite the use of
quotas. Thereby demonstrating that the extent of which quotas are successful at
solving the problem of representation is limited. Furthering this, Uganda also
has very poor public education campaigns and a substantial media bias against
women. This has been explicitly demonstrated regarding the advancement of the
Marriage and Divorce Bill in the 9th Parliament (Barenzi, 2014) in
which woman still find it extremely difficult to gain a divorce. Consequently,
the quota system within Uganda has been described as “a legal quota system that
accelerated descriptive representation, yet explicitly disrupts substantive
representation” (Barenzi, 2014). This could be a result of the ‘label’ effect,
in which women are often the result of negative labelling and stereotyped as
being ‘unqualified’. Indeed, this argument has been highlighted by Clayton, who
found that a potential backlash of quotas can result in ‘women’s issues
becoming a less salient or less prestigious agenda’ (2016). This weakens
initiatives for substantive representation as women must comply to the status
quo in order to be taken seriously; this is something that quotas are unable to
tackle as this is a result of institutional or cultural barriers (Krook, 2010).
This presents clear evidence of the shortcomings of quota systems, especially
when they are implemented from the ‘top down’, as whilst it may raise the number
of women in Parliaments, they are limited in guaranteeing effective substantive
representation in Parliaments, because both formal and informal institutional
practices limit the effect that women can have for women in Parliament; thereby
limiting their effectiveness in solving problems regarding women’s
underrepresentation.

In addition to this, quotas
also are limiting in solving the problem of women’s underrepresentation on the
basis that they are unable to govern the type of woman put forward in candidate
lists. This is important on the basis that it will not prevent corruption,
nepotism and elitism within the political process which is central in obtaining
an effective representative democracy. For example, in Argentina, quotas are
ineffective in preventing ‘mujeres de’, literally translating to ‘women of’, in
this case referring to political parties placing “wives or relatives of male
party leaders”; with one commenter observing that the ‘mujeres de’ were “silent
women who never spoke or acted until instructed by party bosses” (Franceschet
& Piscopo, 2008). Therefore, although quotas may improve the overall descriptive
representation of women in parliaments, they do little to ensure that the women
who are placed for candidacy aren’t merely replacing their male relatives
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008); thereby implying that women are mere tokens
within the political system. Argentina is not an isolated case regarding quotas
not representing the wider public, as the the AWS system in Britain tended to
favour more ‘elite women’, elite in this sense is defined as ‘Oxbridge’
graduates (Nugent & Krook, 2015) and found that AWS women were more ‘elite’
than their Labour counterparts. This has been emphasised by Owen Jones who
stated, “AWS have been successful in expanding the career options of a tiny
elite of professional, university educated women” (Nugent & Krook, 2015).
This obviously is not a clear representation of the British population who are
not university educated at this level. This demonstrates that whilst quotas are
capable in improving descriptive representation, they have little impact in
policing the type of candidates put forward. This clearly highlights their
limitations in solving the problems of women’s representation; as despite their
successes in promoting descriptive representation, they are severely limited in
solving women’s underrepresentation in terms of class and race and are overly
simplified on the basis that the experiences of a white, middle-class,
university educated parliamentarian will be extremely different to a working
class, black woman.

Following on from this,
quotas are also limited in monitoring how far women can pursue and gain
positions of power within the political process. It is true that with quotas,
the number of women in Parliament do improve; but how much power do they wield,
and can they gain enviable positions of power? This argument has been put
forward by Folke and Rickne who argued that “despite women’s advances,
descriptive evidence abounds that female representation in positions of
influence” (2012). Thereby, proving that whilst quotas can be effective in
improving overall representation in the countries in which they are implemented
they are relatively ineffective in helping women get to significant positions
of power and influence. This has been demonstrated again in Latin American
countries in which women parliamentarians aren’t effectively represented in
‘power committees’ and have little control over important decisions within
economic, defence or foreign affairs sectors and are often side-lined to
relatively unimportant ‘women’s issues’ and ‘social’ committees (Michelle-Heath,
Schwindt-Bayer, Taylor-Robinson, 2005). One way to perhaps remedy this would be
to introduce quotas at the highest levels of office such as in cabinet or
ministerial positions where they are privy to the highest levels of
decision-making and power. Perhaps a more radical way of improving this
representation would be to introduce quotas for men, as suggested by Rainbow
Murray, who argues that gender quotas are a problematic way in promoting the
idea that ‘men are the norm and women are the “other”’ (2014). Consequently, by
implementing these quotas at the highest levels of decision making could be
beneficial in the likes of Latin American countries who struggle enormously
with women reaching significant positions of power, despite their large presence
in parliament. This is due to the fact that until women are at the heart of
decision making committees or are privy to the highest levels of power, current
gender quotas will be relatively ineffective at solving the problem of
representation on the basis that despite the increased descriptive
representation caused by gender quotas it does little to allow women to rise
significant positions of power as this route is often blocked by gendered
institutional practices, norms and values.

On a further note, the way
in which quotas are executed in different countries is enormously influential
regarding how they solve the problem of representation. Therefore, suggesting
that the extent of which quotas are successful in solving the problem of
women’s underrepresentation is dependent on the nature of their implementation.
Friedanvall and Dahlerup, have highlighted this argument by stating that
“historical jumps in women’s representation can be achieved by many other means
besides quotas…and reversely, quotas do not always result in increased
representation” (2005). The effectiveness of quotas in terms of substantive
interests depends on this. For example, if women are elected via the ‘fast
track’ (Dahlerup & Friedanvall, 2005) with quotas being implemented immediately,
then although their descriptive representation may increase dramatically, it may
have very little effect on women’s empowerment and substantive representation if
these women do not have a strong support network or power base to fall back on.
This argument is furthered by Krook who emphasised the importance of
mass-mobilisation and the role of the public/private divide in the impact of
quotas (2010). This proves that quotas do not automatically lead to the
empowerment and further representation of women if elected via the fast track.
Dahlerup and Friedanvall conclude that critical acts are central to tackling
the problem of women’s substantive representation (2005). A way of solving this
would be to ensure that quotas are introduced alongside the removal of cultural
barriers, with women’s organisations working with parliaments to educate those
in the executive about the importance of women’s interests; thereby assisting
in solving the problem of women’s substantive representation alongside increasing
their descriptive representation. This incremental change has proved to be
hugely successful in countries such as Sweden; whose women are represented both
descriptively and substantively; with studies proving that their input has
improved the quality of the Swedish parliament (Dahelrup & Fridanvall,
2005). Whilst being a slower and more gradual process, it would prevent women’s
representation being purely symbolic, allowing to create real and meaningful
change; on the basis that quotas alone are relatively limited in solving the
problem of women’s representation without the discourse from outside
institutions or the support of those in power positions within parliament.

In addition to this, the use
of quotas alone is not enough to solve the problem of representation, as their
success is governed by their design and how they fit into the current electoral
system. This is highlighted by Schwindt-Bayer who stated that “the quota’s
effectiveness depends on their design” (2011). Indeed, whilst quotas themselves
provide the theoretical foundation to solve the problem of women’s
underrepresentation via critical mass theory, they are limited without the
implementation of a wide variety of other factors. A key example of such a
factor would be using sanctions to enforce the quota. The most effective of
which see electoral authorities banning the lists of non-complying parties if
they do not have an appropriate number of women (Kenny, 2015); this has been
seen in the case of Belgium which has a gender quota law of 50%, with
non-complying parties being refused by the electoral authorities (Friedenvall
& Dahlerup, 2013). Belgium currently has 38% of women in its Parliament
(IPU, 2017), in comparison to the likes of Indonesia, which despite a 30% quota
implementation, only 11% of its legislature is made up of women
(Schwindt-Bayer, 2011). This therefore proves that the singular use of quotas
is not sufficient in solving problems of women’s representation as it requires
the assistance of outside factors for quotas to be fully effective. In addition
to this, the type of electoral system can also have a strong impact on the
effectiveness of quotas, this has been highlighted by Walters who stated: “electoral systems are really driving
the change in the effectiveness of quotas” (2015); again, proving that quotas are
reliant on a host of other factors to be successful. It is often stated that
quotas work best when implemented in a PR system with high party district
magnitudes and a closed-list, allowing parties to place women in electable
positions (Jones, 1999). This has been seen in countries such as Bolivia in
which 1/3 positions must be occupied by a woman (Jones, 1999). In contrast to
this, Brazil, despite having a 30% gender quota implemented, women only make up
10.7% of the lower house and 14.8% of the Senate (IPU, 2017). This is partly
due to the open-list PR system used in Brazil which is more individualised
(Miguel, 2008) and therefore allows voters to root for specific candidates.
This reinforces the statement by Schwindt-Bayer arguing that success of quotas
is heavily reliant on their design (2011), as quotas systems which are
implemented with closed-list, PR systems with high district party magnitudes
are more successful in solving the problems of women’s descriptive underrepresentation
than those who operate under a majoritarian system or PR systems which operate
with an open-list system with low district party magnitudes. This is on the
basis that these systems allow for a more individualist and personable
electoral system, lacking compatibility with quotas, proving that the design of
the electoral system is paramount to a quota’s success.

Consequently, whilst it
would be wrong to dismiss quotas as completely ineffective in solving the
problems of women’s underrepresentation within politics; it is true that they
are heavily reliant on the individual design, implementation and cultural
factors of a country. This is demonstrated through the varying successes that
quotas have had worldwide, with some countries improving at a faster rate than
others. Therefore, quotas are severely limited in solving the problem of
women’s underrepresentation alone; what is necessary for quotas to reach their
full potential are strong enforcement methods, an open-list PR system with high
district party magnitudes and finally an attitude of cultural equality within
society. The latter being the hardest to achieve but could be accomplished via
international pressures, a mobilisation of women’s groups within civil society
and more comprehensive public education on the difference that women can make
if allowed to have a significant voice in policy decision making processes. We
are already seeing this sort of success in countries such as Rwanda, Sweden and
Belgium in which women’s groups within civil society is becoming increasingly
influential in working with parliaments. Consequently, if this is achieved,
gender quotas will be able to execute substantial strides in solving the
problem of women’s underrepresentation within politics. However, presently,
quotas are viewed as a simple solution to an extremely complex problem.

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