Homeland Security And The Paris Attacks: A Case Study

Background

Discuss about the Homeland Security for Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic.
 

Home land security acts a major role in securing a country’s safety and gives protection from mainly terrorist attacks and other disasters. The entity was developed aftermath of terrorist attack of 9/11. Thus, the enterprise aims to take all the possible measures in order to deal with attacks from terrorism. In addition to that the entity also performs other duties in terms of safety within the country. However, several controversies have been raised regarding the key performance index of the entity. Meanwhile, the entity has also received a wide range of criticism with the allegations of violating civil rights. Thus, shedding light on the role played by homeland security for the purpose of safety and security of a country, the paper gives a case study of Paris attack in the year of 2017 (Chrysalis, 2018). 130 people died in the incident while another 413 were injured creating a sensation all over the globe and raising question on the role of security organizations. Several reviews including Nato’s were published in order to find out the reason for which the homeland security agencies were failed to anticipate such a dread nous incident that not only claimed the lives of people but also affected negatively the entire economy of the country.  The whole course of the discussion sheds light on analyzing the incident to figure out whether the homeland security was failed to manage the incident in terms of safety and security of the country. While discussing this study focuses on assessing the effectiveness of entity in dealing disasters.

The paper exclusively throws the light on the importance of proactive approach of homeland security organizations as they take the responsibility of protecting a nation and its people. The study analyses how security organization had failed in fulfilling its responsibilities in order to prior anticipation of the whole idea. The study holds immense importance since it elaborates on the role of homeland security and it will have the potential to draw the attention of the nation to take more proactive approach. 

On 13th November of 2015, a group of terrorists hurled attack on Paris which resulted death of 130 people and injury of 413. Around 8 terrorists of Islamic state carried out the attack. The entire plan was carried out by a commando of 8 Islamic terrorists. They parted in 3 teams while the entire strike was planned and executed by Belgian national Abdelhamid Abaaoud in an assault in Saint-Denis on 18^th of November (Review 2018). Six attacks had been launched. In an attack, three suicide bombings occurred while in another attack, the fourth suicide bombing occurred. In other four attacks, public shootings were reported. The four locations are Rue Alibert street, Blataclan Theatre, Rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi and Avenue de la République. Meanwhile, adjacent to the Stade de France, three explosions took place. Officials of homeland security organizations identified some of the terrorists as terrified radicalized individuals, meanwhile others had been perceived outside contenders with an experience of battlefield in Syria.

The Paris Attacks of 2015

The Paris assaults are instances of intelligence disappointment which required a more profound examination in days. A report had been published in order to assess what turned out badly in the knowledge process that drove the safety administrations not distinguish a risk or measures to ward off such a strike (Static1.squarespace.com 2018). As far as the information regarding the profiles of the assailants was concerned, the intelligence disappointment was identified in 3 territories: failure in the discovery as well as prioritization of dangers, failure in reconnaissance, failure in data sharing. 

However, the perception of recognized perils failed in the Paris attack case in spite of existing information and new snippets of data. The Bataclan suicide air ship Ishmael Omar Mostefai and Samy Amimour were checked by French bureau of intelligence from 2010-2012.  Meanwhile, it was moreover understood that both have wandered out to Syria in order to combat close-by Islamic State; the same for the main impetus of the attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2018). Each of the three outside contenders known to the intelligence officials could escape the watch and then recede and forth among Europe and Syria. It shows the Threat Prevention and Security Policy which is popularly known as TSPS has completely failed to prevent the Paris ambushes since there was no coordination among the Departments of Homeland Securities.

In this way, notwithstanding the manner that they had been perceived as a hazard, the surveillance resulted failure to trace them in the Belgian and French areas. This might have allowed the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers to increase their caution level as well as in a possible manner prevent the strikes. As per the Turkish intelligence officials, it has been educated by Turkey to France twice in December 2014 and June 2015, regarding the proximity on its area of suicide bomber Mostefai. However, no response was received from Paris officials (BBC News 2018). Thus we have been lead to the third locale of failure of intelligence: Information Sharing Policy.

Once the threat is perceived, an unfaltering and feasible checking must be set up. France has around 11,000 radicalized persons; of them around 1,200 are remote warriors. Considering this for an all the live long day perception of a suspect, a security gadget needs to pass on no under 15-20 persons, France would require around 220,000 officials to screen its suspects. Clearly not an appropriate decision pondered the compelled resources (Steafel 2018). The Bataclan suicide air ship Ishmael Omar Mostefai and Samy Amimour were seen by French officials during 2010-2012, and it had been also understood that both had taken off to Syria to combat near to Islamic State (Library 2018). Each one of the three remote contenders known to the authorities could escape surveillance and push ahead and in reverse among Europe and Syria unnoticed. Accordingly, regardless of the way that had been perceived as a hazard, the perception resulted failure in tracing them in Belgian and French areas. This might have let the security organizations increase their alert level as well as put an end on the strikes in a possible manner. As showed by Turkish specialists, Turkey revealed to France twice regarding the closeness on the district of suicide plane Mostefai in December 2014 and June 2015 anyway did not get any contribution from Paris. This refers to the failure of intelligence bureau in terms ofInformation Sharing Policy(Times, 2018).  

Intelligence Failures

The Paris strikes included a data sharing issue among a couple of European Union and NATO countries. If the French and Belgian security organizations were to be accused for not keeping the screening on the suspects, other European countries which have observed these suspected persons crossing their areas should be responsible in the like manner (Review 2018). Data sharing is essential centrality keeping in mind that once inside the Schengen area a person can uninhibitedly cross the landmass.

In a more practical manner, this suggests the suspected persons that were known should have been checked in Syria and then kept under stern observation once they made entry in Europe again. Thus is can be said that it  EU countries must share a data of the radicals who have been suspected. Therefore allowing assistant countries in order to “reset their radars”, take after along as well as advice regarding basic data concerning the suspects (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2018). The failure of intelligence bureaus among France and Turkey on Mostefai was extensively surprising as the two NATO accomplices had been sharing information for a significant long time regarding security.

France inside intelligence association DGSI has near about 3,300 officials, who are endowed along with checking 20,000 individuals on appointed in national security screening records. 11,000 suspects out of them were determined as Islamist radicals along with Scotland Yard’s Counter Terror Command (BBC News 2018). Essentially, the learning is incredibly overstretched and unequipped for adjusting tosuch a threat.

Defense as well as security officials in most of the European/NATO countries had persevered through clear spending cuts over the span of ongoing years, on account of the monetary crisis and the resulting execution of gravity measures (Library 2018). The 9/11attacks in Washington and New York were by then was blurred in the memory of policy makers due to economic crisis across the world. 

According to an investigation conducted by French parliamentary soon aftermath of Paris attack in 2015, the homeland security organizations of France were completely failed to manage post situation of the attacks (Steafel 2018). Soon after Paris strikes, President Hollande proclaimed 8,500 new officials would be adjoined to the organizations of security.

In the United Kingdom, the organizations of intelligence officials would augment up to 15%, along around 1,900 new officials. Besides, remarkable troops from the SAS and SBS joined inside Scotland Yard’s Counter Terror Command (Times 2018). In order to manage the situation after the Paris attacks, monetarily arrangements for flight security had been increased to 18 million GBP. In addition, wellbeing endeavors were taken in order to stay in planes as well as air terminals in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Such new reexamination in flying space was dictated through the shooting down of Russian Metrojet flight 7K9268 in North Sinai on October 31st by Islamic State-related “Sinai Province” mental oppressor (Steafel 2018).

Data Sharing

Thus the question arises, will extending resources be adequate to keep up a key separation from further ambushes on European soil? However, the response is no as well as elucidation is twofold.

In addition, security organizations are limited to the extent of advantages, and by the laws dealing with the understanding advantages in a liberal part of control framework (Library 2018). This proposes a trade off among security and insurance that most of the cases close for the last specified.

France has six units of intelligence taking note of distinctively to inside, economy and defense administrations. Fenech said that except the diverse understanding failings, the Bataclan ambush, which butchered 90, could have been turned away (BBC News 2018). It was said by Fenech that each one of the aficionados connected with the strikes had been hailed to authorities. Some of them had past sentiments, or were under surveillance in a judicial manner in either France or in Belgium. After 200 extended lengths of hearings, it was found by the commission that several intelligence associations had endeavored to confer regarding known Islamists. The Islamists were either under the judicial observation or behind bars or had their mobiles traced at some point or the other (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2018).

Amedy Coulibaly, who was alleged to have killed four people along with a policewoman during a strike at a grocery shop in January of the previous year, was a known offender as well as a radical. While serving a correctional facility sentence for his part he was again accused for plotting a plan to rescue another dread criminal from detain, he had been hailed as radicalized. This data was not conveyed from imprison organizations to the intelligence bureaus on his release (Static1.squarespace.com 2018). Kouahi stated that one of theaggressors Charlie Hebdo was lifted during his shifting from Paris toward the north-eastern region of Reims.

Samy Amimour, the accused who was involved in the Bataclan strike, could go to Syria regardless of the denial imposed upon him to leave France. It was reported that along another future Bataclan aggressor who had been similarly enlisted in police records he escaped (Review 2018). The report thus stated that surveillance failed to keep a track as to when prosecuted radicalized criminals were freed from imprison. It was told by an anti-terrorism judge to the commission of inquiry that terrorists had been at risk. The statement was made as an unclear stage of surveillance was observed when “brief period crooks who offer marijuana” during the supervision of court freed from imprison (Chrisafis2018).

Lessons Learned

Moreover, the commission hailed up failures in European correspondence, coordination and security. Meanwhile, a Socialist MP as well as the presenter of the report stated, “Europe is not up to the mark” of combating terrorism. He included the treatment of the occasion of Abdelhamid Abaaoud for example. Abbaoud was a Belgian national acknowledged as the instigator of such strikes of Novembers. In the meantime, Abbaoudsur faced somewhere in the year of 2015 on Greek authorities’ radar who thought about his centrality as an Isis figure orchestrating ambush on European targets (Review 2018).

In the same month a raid was conducted by Belgian police in a Verviers’s terrorist cell that had managed interfaces with Abaaoud. It was said by commission that Belgians failed to alert Greek authorities that search would continue until 30 minutes before the ambushes. This suggested Abaaoud could elope from Athens. In respect to that the commission said, “This shows an honest to goodness inconvenience in talk and investment” (Static1.squarespace.com 2018).

The report stated that due surveillance negligence, Salah Abdeslam, the principle surviving individual from November Paris strike accused, escaped from France to his country Belgium hours after ambushes. On the day after the strikes at around 9.10 in the morning, Abdeslam was stalked by French gendarmes close to the periphery of French-Belgian (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 2018). Abdeslam’s name had been enlisted in cross-periphery data structure for essential infringement, yet Belgian authorities completely resulted failure to incorporate that he had been under watch as a ‘jihadi’. French officials accordingly received directives in order to discharge him.

Following an hour, Belgians acquired again the data regarding his radicalization. After 4 months of the incident he was caught in Belgium and he is at exhibit in a French prison (BBC News 2018). It was found by the inquiry that the very emergency circumstance constrained following November attacks, and more over the course of action of thousands troops to watch the roads under a military movement called as Operation Sentinelle, received only a confined influence upon safety and security.

It was regarded by the report that the way the soldiers from Operation Sentinelle who were accessible outside Bataclan in midst of the dread nous oppressor strike did not intercede in light of the way that they were not offered solicitations to do that (Library 2018).

Pietrasanta, who made the commission’s last 300-page report that was published publicly, stated that in spite of the risks mentioned previously made against the Bataclan concert auditorium, the Paris attacks resulted intelligence failure. In addition, in spite of indications were made to the French officials regarding a jihadi coming back to France, preventive measures were not taken by the security organizations. However, the report stated that it was not possible to anticipate that Bataclan would be next target of the terrorists (BBC News 2018).

Conclusion

The 13^th November Paris ambushes were considered as third mental oppressor strike that took place in French after Charlie Hebdo in January as well as the shooting on-board the Amsterdam-Paris train in August in the same year. The incidents were not regarded as a “wake-up” approach for further terrorist threat in France as well as Europe with everything taken into account. On the other hand, the Paris strikes ought to require a significant overview of European intelligence process, their risk assessment frameworks, the money related and legitimate resources accessible to them. In order to mange disastrous situation like Paris strikes, it was mandatory for the European understanding system to agree upon a more gainful information transferring structure which does not essentially recommend the development of a European Intelligence Agency. In case the intelligence agencies failed to put a fix on these discharges, the question on safety and security will still be there if another mental oppressor ambush will happen, irrespective of the fact the when and how terrible it will be.  

References

BBC News. 2018. Paris attacks: What happened on the night. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994 [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].

Chrisafis, A. 2018. Paris attacks inquiry finds multiple failings by French intelligence agencies. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/paris-attacks-inquiry-multiple-failings-french-intelligence-agencies [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2018. The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. [online] Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/the-paris-attacks-and-the-evolving-islamic-state-threat-to-france/ [Accessed 1 Aug. 2018].

Library, C. 2018. 2015 Paris Terror Attacks Fast Facts. [online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/08/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.html [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].

Review, N. 2018. The Paris attacks. A case of intelligence failure?. [online] NATO Review. Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/isil/paris-attacks-terrorism-intelligence-isis/en/index.htm [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].

Static1.squarespace.com. 2018. The Attacks on Paris: Lessons Learned. [online] Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4e0b79bf [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].

Steafel, E. 2018. Paris terror attack: Everything we know on Saturday afternoon. [online] Telegraph.co.uk. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11995246/Paris-shooting-What-we-know-so-far.html [Accessed 30 Jul. 2018].

Times, T. 2018. Three Hours of Terror in Paris, Moment by Moment. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/13/world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html [Accessed 27 Jul. 2018].