Linking National Identity Numbers to Social Media

Symbolic
Violence on Social Media
The Potential and Limits of Linking Users’ Registrations to their
National Identity Numbers for the Regulation and Investigation of Crime on
Social Media in the United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
The increasing role of social media in the day-to-day
life in the UK makes social networking platforms an attractive space for
criminals. Social media is capable of perpetuating existing crime by increasing
its scale and scope and decreasing its cost, but it is also a breeding ground
for fundamentally new types of crime. The proliferation of crime on social
media has led to calls to tighten the grip of the law around the sector. At the
same time, adverse regulation in the UK has proved counterproductive and
produced uneven results. The purpose of this project is to explore the
potential and limits of the proposal to link users’ social media registrations
to their national identity number, as a means to address the challenges for traditional
criminal law in tackling crime on social media. The proposal is implemented in
different countries around the world – on social media platforms in China and
South Korea, and in various countries around the globe in the context of
mandatory registration of mobile SIM cards. The main argument of the project is
that although the measure has the potential to address the difficulties of
attribution of crime to social media, it is difficult to enforce in practice
and is likely to lead to more problems than it resolves.
Key words: social media, crime,
criminal law, regulation, investigation, Internet regulation, surveillance
INTRODUCTION
Social media is a recent invention which allows
individuals to express themselves and interact using the Internet. The two
major social media, Facebook and Twitter, were founded in 2004 and 2006
respectively.[1]
Today, Facebook has roughly 38 million users in the UK[2]
and Twitter – 17 million.[3] In
addition the well-known providers, there are different social media platforms
around the globe with different focus of activity, but all with the same
purpose of enabling people to interact with one another using the Internet –
social networking. However, although social media is generally beneficial in
fostering freedom of expression online, they have also become a new breeding
ground for criminal activity – from terrorism to cyber bullying, revenge
pornography, virtual mobbing, sexual grooming, etc.[4]

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1. Background
The early cases in which the difficulties in regulating
social media became apparent were in relation to contempt of court. In 2008, a
juror posted the details of a child abduction and sexual assault case on
Facebook by adding “I don’t know which way to go, so I’m holding a poll”.[5]
She did not use any privacy settings on her profile, so the message was easily
discovered and the Crown Court hearing the case was informed, as a result of
which the juror was dismissed.[6]
Similarly in Davey,[7]
two jurors were found guilty of contempt of court – one of them because he
posted on Facebook the sentence: “Woooow I wasn’t expecting to be in a jury
Deciding a paedophile’s fate, I’ve always wanted to F*ck up a paedophile & now I’m within the
law!”[8]
The increased occurrence of criminal cases involving social media inevitably
leads to calls for more regulation and moderation of the criminal justice
system.
At the same time, adverse regulation of cybercrime has
proved counterproductive and produced uneven results. For example, the UK has
the most draconian laws on child pornography – s. 63 Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008[9]
criminalises the possession of extreme pornography which portrays acts that
threaten one’s life, bestiality, necrophilia, etc. The year the act entered
into force, a bus driver from Wrexham was charged with possession of extreme
pornography because a friend of his sent him a prank video of a woman having
sex with a man in a tiger costume, which was thought to be bestiality.[10]
Eventually the charges were dropped, but the driver’s life was ruined because
he was refused contact with his young daughter and suffered a heart attack as a
result of the trial.[11]
The law as it stands now effectively criminalises the works of art of the Goth
community which depict death, vampirism, etc. and even some horror films,
depicting threats to one’s lives.
Therefore, on the one hand the new challenges call for
new regulatory responses. On the other hand, these regulatory responses need to
be balanced against numerous other factors, so that the law produces adequate results.
2. Research Question
The main research question which this dissertation is
to address is: ‘To what extent linking users’ registration to their national
identity number or equivalent identifiers is a feasible solution to the
problems of regulating and investigating crime and violence on social media?’
The question raises a number of subsidiary questions:
(1) To what extent social media creates new
opportunities for violent crime?
(2) What are the challenges in regulation and
investigation of crime on social media?
(3) What are the advantages of linking users’ social
media registrations with their national ID number?
(4) Are these advantages likely to resolve the
challenges of regulation and investigation of crime on social media?
These questions will be addressed through the prism of
the UK. The UK is a suitable example for assessing the impact of such a
proposal. The reasons for this are as follows: (1) It does not have extreme
freedom of expression laws like the US, which makes the introduction of such a
measure practically possible. (2) It is practicable to examine the introduction
of a requirement within one jurisdiction, rather than globally, as it is not
possible for different states with different social values to agree to universal
implementation. (3) It is a familiar jurisdiction to the author, allowing
him/her to take into account various societal and legal factors, such as the
influence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the
European Union.
The question is relevant and in fact, on the current
UK agenda because of the increasing role of social media in the daily life of
the country and the fact that a solution to crime on social media has not been
found, so practical contributions such as this one contribute to the pool of
ideas of how to conceptualise the problem and how to alleviate it. As a fairly
recent phenomenon, social media is vastly under-researched, so there is a
pressing need to fill this research gap, especially as far as the practical
aspects of law are concerned. Last but not least, the project will demonstrate
how academic legal research can be used to address real-life problems.
3. Structure
The main thesis of the project is that linking users’
social media registrations to their national identity number will create more
problems than it will resolve in the UK. The project will be divided into three
chapters each addressing one or two of the subsidiary research questions.
Chapter I will deal with defining the problems with regulation
and investigation of crime on social media. It will focus on the new
opportunities for individual criminals and criminal groups that social media
creates, the conceptualisation of crime on social media. The chapter will
conclude by outlining the major regulatory challenges.
Chapter II will first discuss the current UK approach to
regulation and investigation of crime on social media, the idea behind it and
its drawbacks. The chapter will then proceed to presenting the proposal of
linking users’ social media registrations to their national identity number by
referring to systems where a similar measure is already in operation – namely,
the mandatory requirements for registration of prepaid SIM cards in some
countries and the operation of the measure on the Sina Weibo social network in
China. The chapter will move on to assessing the potential of applying the
measure within the UK.
Chapter III will be centred on the limitations of linking users’
social media registrations to their national ID numbers. The chapter will
address the practical difficulties of introducing and enforcing the measure in
the UK, its implications on data security, data privacy and freedom of
expression.
4. Methodology
Due to the massive research gap on social media, the
traditional methods of qualitative legal research – close reading, desk
research and analysis of primary legislation, case law and academic resources,
will be combined with analysis of non-academic sources. This will be done with
the vision of keeping the project up-to-date and filling the gaps of academic
research, where necessary. For the same purposes, the project will adopt a
multi-disciplinary approach by drawing arguments areas other than law, such as
criminology, psychology, sociology, politics and International Relations.
~~~
CHAPTER I
The Problem with Regulating and Investigating Crime and Violence on Social Media
OVERVIEW: Before turning to the possible solutions to the
problem of regulating crime and violence on social media, it is important to
define the problem itself and the challenges for regulation. This chapter will
address this task. Its first part will focus on the ways in which social media
create new opportunities for committing crime. The second part of the chapter
will conceptualise crime on social media as symbolic violence whose centre
point is speech and expression. Despite these similarities, there are, however,
differences between different types of crimes on social media, which puts to
doubt the idea that the solution to all of them could be a one-size-fits-all
one. The final part of the chapter will be dedicated to the challenges in
regulation and prosecution of crime on social media, whose understanding is
vital in the discussion of the possible solutions.
1. Social Media – Ample Opportunities for Violent Crime
The proliferation of violence on social media follows
the maxim ‘Crime follows opportunity’. Social media-related crime was a minor
issue in 2008 – four years after the launch of Facebook, but between 2008 and
2012 the reports of such crime grew 7 times.[12]
Social media presents ample opportunities for criminals to commit crime.
1.1 Numerous Victims
Social media offers to criminals practically an
indefinitely large pool of potential victims and data they can target.
Nowadays, people spend an increasing amount of time on social media websites.
According to data from Statista, the average time per day that users spend on
social networking platforms is 118 minutes.[13]
The global social media population is more than 2 billion people.[14]
With this amount of potential victims, it is hardly surprising that social
media is attractive to criminals.
1.2 Ease of Collecting
Information
With users posting and sharing practically everything
on social media, it is easy for criminals to collect data about a particular
victim.[15]
This became apparent in the case with Kim Kardashian’s jewellery robbery in Paris.
Kardashian is one of the social media stars – days before the robbery she
shared a picture of herself wearing a massive diamond ring. She was also
constantly posting what she was doing and her whereabouts during the Paris
fashion show she was participating in. This made her an easy target for the
robbers.[16]
1.3 Collaboration
between Criminals
The ease of communication and its instant nature
facilitate the communication between criminals and the criminals and the
victims, making organised crime and group crime easier and less costly.
Criminals can group themselves together around the need to commit ephemeral
acts and pool their skills and knowledge.[17]
For instance, pedophile groups enable pedophiles not only to communicate
easier, but to show off and compare themselves with others, which increases
their incentives to commit crimes.[18]
Terrorist organisations using tactical violence to achieve their political
goals use social media for recruitment, propaganda, fund raising, sharing
strategies for attacks and data mining,[19]
e.g. ISIS is operating multiple Twitter accounts, which allow it to rapidly
disseminate propaganda.[20]
1.4 Empowering of
Individual Offenders
While facilitating organised crime, at the same time
social media empowers individual offender – the so-called ‘empowered single
agents’[21]
who can carry out complex and far-reaching offences which can be repeated
infinite number of times – previously beyond their financial and organisational
capabilities.[22]
1.5 New Crimes
Social media can facilitate new crimes such as revenge
porn – the uploading of explicit images, which were obtained consensually by
one of the partners in a relationship after the relationship has broken down
for the purposes of humiliation of the victim in front of their friends,
colleagues and employers.[23]
At the same time, social media websites provides new methods of committing
already existing crimes such as abuse, harassment and issuing threats.[24]
Social media presents an opportunity for ‘performance’
crimes – the ability of criminals to create accounts of the crime through text,
images or video, which are then distributed to the public via social media
platforms.[25]
Thus, social media has added new type of crime to the traditional forms where
criminals prefer to hide their identity and actions.[26]
In short, social media increases the speed of crime, the distance that it is capable of reaching, its volume and reduces its cost.[27]
2. Conceptualising Crime and Violence on Social Media
2.1 Symbolic Violence
on Social Media
Violence promoted by social media is objective, as
opposed to subjective.[28]
Subjective violence such as robbery or terrorism is the most perceivable one,
while objective violence such as the one on social media is to do with symbolic
violence and discourse – it is violence that happens primarily through
language.[29]
Social media has perpetuated symbolic violence. Although users might think that
they know who they talk to on social media, in reality they speak to a computer
screen. Much of the audience on social media is invisible and thus, it is not
possible to predict to what extent something said could be interpreted as
offensive in another context and prompt violent reaction. This is the so-called
‘context collapse’.[30]
2.2 Crime and Violence
on Social Media as a Speech Act
Crime and violence on social media includes various
speech acts such as trolling – intentional disruption of a forum or discussion
by causing offence and starting an argument; cyber bullying – bullying through
the use of social media or other electronic means; revenge porn and virtual
mobbing – use of social media by a group of people to message or to make
comments to or about an individual, whose position they are opposed to.[31]
Furthermore, most offences that can be committed using words or other forms of
expression such as images, can be committed through social media, e.g.
harassment, threatening violence to a person.[32]
Other Internet offences, such as sexual grooming, are committed via the use of
speech, i.e. child abusers use social media websites to contact children in
order to obtain false sense of trust, child sex abusers use speech to lure
children into disclosing personal information, encourage them to send indecent
pictures, blackmail them into sending even more revealing pictures and persuade
children to meet them in flesh.[33]
2.3 Classification of
Social Media Crimes
The crimes and violence on social media can thus be
classified in the following manner:[34]

Social media-assisted
crimes are those whereby if
the social media is removed, they will still be committed through alternative
means, despite the fact that their number will be reduced. Social media
provides entirely new opportunities for social
media-enabled crimes. These crimes are regulated through existing criminal
law, however, had it not been for social media, their number will be
significantly reduced. The third category of social media crimes are those dependent on the social networking
platforms – these are crimes that are either not within the scope of the
criminal justice system, or the criminal justice system was not intended to
tackle them.[35]
Despite the centrality of speech in all crime on social media, the differences
mean that they need to be addressed in different ways, i.e. while social
media-assisted crimes can be addressed through existing criminal law, this is
not necessarily the case with social media-enabled crimes and social
media-dependent crimes, whose social media element requires a different
response.
2.4 Regulation of
Social Media Crime and Freedom of Expression
The centrality of speech in crime on social media is a
challenge for regulation as freedom of expression is a personal freedom under
Art. 10(1) European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).[36]
Therefore, interference with the freedom of speech has to be justified on
serious grounds according to the requirements of Art. 10(2) ECHR. Any
regulation of crime on social media has to strike a balance between protection
of freedom of expression and prevention of crime. Sometimes, this is incredibly
difficult as the line between crime and offence is extremely fine. While it is
clear that the conduct of a person who uses social media to abuse children is
criminal, the situation is less clear in relation to offensive comments. Social
media are an arena of clashes of taste. For example, celebrity deaths often
lead to different reactions from social media users – from sadness to annoyance
at the attention that they receive.[37]
The question for the regulators is then whether comments or memes that mock the
pronouncements of grief in an offensive manner should be criminalised.
3. Challenges to Regulation and Prosecution of Crime and Violence on Social Media
3.1 Jurisdiction
The first fundamental issue regarding the regulation
of crime and violence on social media is jurisdictional – the cross-border
nature of the Internet makes the prosecution of criminals who target domestic
victims difficult, if not impossible. The English courts have tackled the
problem by assuming jurisdiction if a substantial measure of the activities
constituting the crime has taken place in England[38] –
this is the so-called ‘substantial measures’ test.[39]
Even so, if the culprit is entirely based outside of the territory of the UK
and there is not a connecting factor between them and the UK, there is very
little that the UK can do to curtail their activity. Deciding whether the
criminal activity took place within the UK or has substantially taken place in
the UK is not a straightforward question as the manipulation of location is
easy on the Internet.[40]  Furthermore, if the activity in question is
legal in the country of origin but illegal in the country of destination, the
country of destination has very limited ability to influence the foreign
perpetrator. For instance, if the offence is to do with content, the state
could place an obligation on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to filter the
content, or oblige the foreign providers to create country-specific websites
which abide by the local laws.[41]
However, the state cannot actually reach or charge the offender.  This is due to the fact that traditionally
all three types of jurisdiction – legislative, adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction have been based upon the concept of territoriality.[42]
Therefore, the legislature cannot target foreign criminals through legislation,
the judiciary does not have jurisdiction over such cases and the enforcement
agencies cannot enforce the law against them.
3.2 Cost of
Investigation and Prosecution
Secondly, the cost of investigation and prosecution of
cyber crime is immense – it requires huge financial, technical and human
resources.[43]
Cyber crime overall is under-investigated.[44]
One of the reasons for this is the under-reporting of cyber crime and the lack
of knowledge about it on behalf of the public – in 2014 there were 2.46 million
cyber incidents in the UK and only 16,349 cyber-dependent incidents reported.[45]
Public knowledge about crime on social media is distorted by a series of signal
events – shocking events that shape public opinion like the recent NHS hack and
serve as examples of what could happen. This distracts the public from what is
actually happening and what the current tendencies in crime on social media
are.[46]
Another reason is that cyber crime is perceived as individually small in impact
and thus, not worthy of expenditure from the finite police resources.[47]
Moreover, cyber crime and crime and violence on social media fall outside of
the traditional police activities and the police have little experience in
dealing with it.[48]
While social media can be useful in investigating
crime, it is exactly this effect that it has that puts an additional strength
on the finite police resources as it enables the discovery of evidence of minor
crimes which were previously invisible.[49]
This creates the temptation to investigate the offences which are the easiest
target, distracts the police from investigating serious crime and violence on
social media and results in innocent people being wrongly accused of crimes.[50]
Social media also provides readily available information about individuals that
amateur detectives (the so-called ‘couch detectives’ – civilians who contribute
to evidence gathering) can use to conduct sleuthing and then forward the details
to the police. These digital sleuths, though technically savvy, are not
familiar with the procedures of investigating crimes, which results in
confusion, misinformation and false accusations.[51]
The role of the police in policing cyber crime is more
limited than in traditional crime. ISPs through their terms and conditions also
have the power to dictate the rules on the Internet and social media – on the
one hand, these are the access providers and on the other hand – the content
providers.
3.3 Limited Impact of
Law
Law is only one of the few factors that shape
behaviour[52]
– thus, it only has a limited influence on outcomes in social media. Other
factors are social norms, the market and architecture (code).[53]
Lawis an
order to behave in certain way under a threat of punishment – this is the
so-called first-order enforcement. However, law can also regulate through
second order enforcement by empowering certain groups in society, so that they
can use ridicule to enforce the law, thus imposing informal sanctions on the
wrongdoers. There is also third-order enforcement when individuals internalise
legal rules and avoid committing a crime due to the prospect of guilt.[54]
Social normsregulate
behaviour by defining what is permissible within a given society through many
slight and often forceful sanctions that members of a society impose on each
other.[55]
Similar to law, norms regulate by threatening punishment, but the punishment is
not institutionalised or centralised. If a user publishes child pornography
content on social media, they will be reported to the social networking
platform by numerous users.
In practice, however, norms on social media are
difficult to implement as the social media community consists of people from
different countries and different backgrounds. While there is a broad agreement
that certain acts such as child pornography on social media are wrong, there is
not such an agreement about other areas. For instance, in China the use of
social media as a tool for human flesh search engines – virtual mobbing on
people who have allegedly did something wrong in order to make their life a
misery is not objected,[56]
while in the UK it will be considered online stalking and harassment. Thus,
social norms in social media are very few and with limited impact on behaviour.
Market regulates through setting prices and
determining the supply and demand of a service.[57]
Its influence is largely eliminated in the context of social media as it is
free to use and available at all times.
Architecture (code) regulates through setting the
characteristics of a given society that make it what it is. An example of
regulation through architecture in the real world is Napoleon III’s decision to
broaden the streets of Paris in order to avoid the disruption in the city at
times of mass protests.[58]
In the social media context, an example of regulation through code is the
collection of cookies and provision of personalised content and targeted
advertising. The potential of regulation of social media through code is huge.
The threat is that this might turn the social networking platforms into social
engineering platforms.
Overall, the factors that are likely to influence
behaviour on social media are law and code or the combination of both. The
danger of reducing law to software (code) which results in automated policing,
applying rules without envisaging the prospect of discretion, is immense.[59]
When code is used to replace discretion, individuals are judged upon what they
could do, rather than what they did.[60]
This creates a sense of insecurity and public animosity when new regulation
through code is introduced. An example of this is the Investigatory Powers Act
2016.[61]
S. 87 allows for obtaining and retaining data, such as Internet connection
records, in order to identify the websites that somebody has visited and the
search terms they have used. Part 6 of Act provides for bulk interception
warrants and bulk acquisition of personal data. The intercepted material can be
used by a number of institutions including the HMRC. The HMRC recently
introduced a supercomputer so that it can take advantage of its new powers.
With it, it can access information from emails, bank accounts, website
registrations and match it with information submitted by taxpayers in their
self-assessment declarations.[62]
The impact of this is unknown, but most likely, it will lead to a number of
false accusations or false assumptions on behalf of the HMRC and more public
outrage. This is an example of regulation through law, which has subsequently
turned into regulation through code, which has negative impacts on people’s
lives.
3.4 The Problem of
Non-Attribution of Crime on Social Media
The issue of attribution refers to assigning
responsibility for committing an attack.[63]
Generally speaking, criminals have a strong incentive to avoid identification
because this is the first step to them being charged, tried, convicted and
sanctioned for their wrongdoing.[64]
Criminals do not usually prefer to identify themselves.
Anonymity is a central concept to the Internet. There
is no consistent approach on anonymity by social media websites,[65]
e.g. Facebook has a real-name policy, but there is nothing stopping the users
from registering a fake account, Twitter allows anonymity while Google+ has
abandoned its real-name policy. Twitter emphasises that anonymity is valuable
for dissidents, whistleblowers and journalists reporting from conflict areas.[66]
At the same time though, anonymity facilitates crimes such as cyber bullying –
the Irish case of Erin Gallagher in which a teenager committed suicide as she
could not cope with the bullying she received through her ask.fm webiste which
promoted anonymity,[67]
demonstrates its negative impact. Defamation Act 2013,[68]
though not in the context of criminal law, incentivises social media platforms
to have a procedure that enables them to identify their users. A social media
platform can rely on the defence is s. 5(2) Defamation Act – showing that it
was not the website operator who published the defamatory material. The defence
fails if the claimant shows that it was not possible to identify the actual
publisher, the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint and the
operator did not respond to it in accordance with the Defamation
(Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013.[69]
Anonymity is, however, only one of the problems of
indentifying the perpetrators of crime on social media. The approach to
identifying the perpetrator of a crime in the physical world is to find evidence
at the scene of the crime which lead to a particular individual and locate
witnesses who can identify the criminal.[70]
The assumption of the police officers is that the culprit is still in the
geographical area and thus, they look for sightings of the perpetrator and
individuals who know him. If attribution fails, the officers still assume that
the criminal is in the local area and are on the alert that they might
re-offend.[71]
In cyber crimes generally, location is an ambiguous
concept. Criminals are capable of controlling the computers of innocent
parties, located anywhere in the world, without their knowledge and make them
look as the perpetrators.[72]
If the computers through which crime is committed are dispersed in different
countries, the law enforcement agencies will have to obtain assistance from the
governments in the states in whose territory computers were used.[73]
Obtaining assistance usually takes time. It is also possible that the country
from which assistance is required does not consider the act under investigation
criminal, in which case no assistance will be obtained. The culprits can also
make their location look as if it is changing by controlling different
individual computers every time, which additionally confuses the investigators.
Due to the distance differential between the attacker
and the victim in cybercrime, the point of origin of the attack and its point
of occurrence are not as closely related as in the physical world, where the
point of occurrence is either the same or very close to the point of origin.
Finding the point of occurrence of cybercrime gives little clue of the origin
of the attack,[74]
thus eroding the ability of law enforcement to assume that the attacker is
parochial.
Crimes on social media, especially personal attacks,
often have a connection with the physical world.[75]
This creates confusion as to what the point of origin of the crime is. For
example, if Jane stalks her former boyfriend or employer, using Facebook, the
motives of her act are to be found in events that occurred in the physical
world. The point of origin of the attack is then both in the physical world and
online. On the one hand, to identify the attacker, the police can rely on the
physical contacts of the victim just as in crime in the physical world. On the
other hand, Facebook in the case of Jane is also a point of the attack as she
persistently uses it for stalking. Even if she might not have revealed her
identity to Facebook, its use can provide inferential data as to her identity.
This is the easier option for the investigation authorities.
However, when the victim and the perpetrator are not
in the same physical space, the crime scene is fractures into pieces – the
first one is the actual point of origin, the second one are the intermediaries used
to make the crime look as originating from a particular place and the third one
– the point of occurrence. Often this results in false assumptions that the
intermediary point is the actual point of origin.
SUMMARY: Social media create a number of new opportunities for
crime and ways of committing crimes by providing a practically indefinite pool
of victims, enabling criminals to collect readily available information about
them and facilitating the communication between criminals around the world. Crime
in social media is not constrained by distance and volume. Culprits can commit
crimes at an increased speed and at a lower cost. Social media have perpetuated
symbolic violence, i.e. violence through discourse. While all crime on social
media is a speech act, the differences between the various types of crime on
social media render a different response. Regulating crime and violence on
social media is inherently problematic because of the jurisdictional
constraints of law and the problem with non-attribution of violent acts. It is
also difficult because of the under-reporting of this type of crime, the
financial and human resources needed for investigating it, the propensity to
investigate the easy targets, the limited role of the police and its general inexperience
and neglect of crime on social media and the implications of regulation on
freedom of expression. Finally, the law only has a limited impact on behaviour
– this is also the case in social media, where architecture or code also plays
a vital role in regulating behaviour. Any regulatory response will have to take
into account and appropriately address these challenges. Therefore, when
discussing regulatory responses, this will be done in the context of the
challenges.
~~~
CHAPTER II
Possible Solutions to the Problem of Regulating
Crime on Social Media – The Case for Linking Users’
Social Media Registrations to their National Identity Number
OVERVIEW: After discussing the problems with regulating,
policing and investigating crime and violence on social media, the project will
now deal with the issue of responses to the challenges. The purpose of this
chapter is to assess the effectiveness of the current UK approach to regulating
crime on social media and present the alternative of linking users’ social
media registrations with their national identity number. Firstly, the current
UK approach will be assessed by examining its theoretical foundations and how
it has been implemented in the context of social media. Secondly, the chapter
will present the proposal of introducing the measure of linking users’
registration to their ID by referring to two examples of cases in which a
similar requirement has been put in practice – the mandatory registration of
prepaid SIM cards in some states and the Sina Weibo social media in China.
Finally, the chapter will discuss the potential of the measure to address the
challenges of regulation and investigation of crime on social media in the UK.
1. The Current UK Approach
1.1 Defining the
Current UK Approach
The current UK approach is best summarised in the
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications report on social media and
criminal offences: ‘what is not an offence off-line should not be an offence
online.’[76]
According to the conclusions of the report, the existing UK legislation is
capable of dealing with task of regulating crime on social media.[77]
The substantive side of this approach is set out in the Crown Prosecution’s
Service October 2016 guidelines on prosecution of crimes involving communications
transmitted through social media.[78]
The guidelines divide the offences on social media in four categories[79] –
(1) communications which constitute threat to violence or damage to property;
(2) communications that specifically target individuals (harassment, stalking,
controlling behaviour, revenge pornography, etc.); (3) communications which
amount to a breach of a court order or a statutory prohibition (juror
misconduct, contempt of court, breach of restraining order, etc.) and (4)
grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false communications. It sets out the
existing primary legislation, tackling crime on social media and the principles
when applying it – there is high threshold at the evidential stage, the context
of social media where communication is instantaneous, casual, often ill thought
out and with unintended consequences, the public interest in prosecution of
crime on social media and Art. 10 ECHR on freedom of expression.[80]
Summary of the Current UK Approach in Respect to Crime
on Social Media:[81]

1.2 Conceptualising the
Current UK Approach
The current UK approach is based on the principle of online-offline
equivalence – the presumption that there should be equivalence of treatment
between online and offline activities and online and offline law respectively.[90]
The principle can be divided into equivalence
of application (the obligations imposed by the legal norm should be
equivalent) and equivalence of outcome of
the law (the effect of applying a norm should be equivalent).[91]
While equivalence of application can easily be achieved, equivalence of outcome
is not at all guaranteed in respect to Internet law. Examples of such
divergence of outcomes are the application of copyright law to the online
environment which is based on the principle of copying, regulation of search
engines which cannot be equated to that of telecoms, access providers or
broadcasters.
1.3. How does it Work
in the Context of Social Media
Social networking platforms converge audio-visual and
print media with communication platforms, thus making the implementation of the
online-offline equivalence principle problematic. Crime on social media differs
from crime in the physical world. For example, cyberbullying differs from
bullying in a number of ways. In the majority of cases, the victims do not know
their perpetrators – roughly in about 31 per cent of cases victims know their
perpetrator.[92]
This has important implications for the victims as it reinforces the
perpetrators’ sense that they can act without fear of punishment and makes them
commit crimes that they would not otherwise commit in real life.[93]
While the victim of traditional bullying can physically escape the torments of
the bully, cyberbullying victims are deprived of this option as most people use
technology on a regular basis, so the victim can be tormented at any time and
any place without having any safe place to retreat to.[94]
There is scientific research showing that some forms of cyberbullying cause
more harm than traditional bullying, especially cyberbullying involving
circulation of videos and images[95]
as once such content is released on social media, its reach grows exponentially
and it is difficult to restrict it, causing permanent humiliation of the
victim.[96]
Given these substantive differences, it is hard to see
how the principle of online-offline equivalence can lead to adequate regulation
of cyberbullying on social media. Firstly, in terms of equivalence of
application, as there is inherent difficulty in identifying the perpetrators of
cybercrimes, and thus, criminals feel that they can act with impunity, it is
not possible to apply the law online in the same manner as in the physical
world. Secondly, as far as equivalence of outcome is concerned, as the harm
caused by cyberbullying is sometimes greater than the harm caused by
traditional bullying, applying the same law does not produce the same result in
terms of delivering justice to the victims. Cyberbullying is only an example of
a social media-assisted crime. The situation of inadequacy of the current
legislation is even worse in respect to social-media enabled and social-media
dependent crimes. For example, there are no readily available legislative means
of prevent the release of disturbing live videos on Facebook[97] –
a criminal practice that became commonplace after the release of the ‘Facebook
live’ feature in 2016.
All of this demonstrates that contrary to the claim
made by the House of Lords report that the existing UK legislation is capable
of dealing with crime on social media, this is not the case, and either serious
adjustment to the existing framework is needed, or fundamentally new
legislation that deals specifically with the issue of cybercrime should be
enacted. A requirement to link social media user registrations with the users’
national identity number is a proposal in light of these problems.
2. The Proposal of Linking Users’ Social Media Registrations with their National Identity Number
This idea originates from the policy in some states to
oblige mobile operators to require proof of identity from users when they sign
up for a pre-paid SIM card.[98]
This requirement is justified on grounds of facilitating law enforcement
agencies in apprehending criminals and terrorists, thus leading to reduction in
crime, terrorism and  anti-social
behaviour.[99]
It was applied in practice in the context of Internet services in China where
in 2011 the government introduced a law requiring users of many online services
to register with their names and provide their national ID number.[100]
This has been put in practice by the biggest Chinese social networking platform
– Sina Weibo.[101]
How this proposal has worked in practice will be discussed below.
2.1 Mandatory Registration of Prepaid SIM Cards
The rationale that different states use for introducing
such a policy differ, but the most common one is curbing criminal activity.[102]
Other reasons include curbing widespread theft of mobile phones. Such is the
case in Latin America where the mobile phone identification number (IMEI
number) is registered against a particular SIM to facilitate investigation of
theft.[103]
In other countries, the primary concern is to ensure that there is adequate age
verification process.[104]
According to the conclusions of the GSM Association’s 2016 report on the
subject,[105]
the decision of states whether to adopt such a policy is directly linked to the
availability of national identity documents that can be matched against an
official government registry.[106]
For example, the UK has no formal verifiable ID system. The repealed Identity
Cards Act 2006[107]
contained a provision for establishing a national identity register,[108]
which was to be a reliable record of registerable facts about individuals in
the UK. The lack of a national identity register and uniform proof of ID is
thus related to the lack of a requirement for mandatory registration of
pre-paid SIMs.[109]
In cases where there is no verifiable national registry and proof of ID is
requested upon registration, often the physical presenting of the documents and
the physical presence of the consumer are required before their registration
can be processed.[110]
The mandatory registration of pre-paid SIMs suffers
from a number of drawbacks. There is a possibility for fraudulent registration
of SIMs by criminals, who have stolen ID details of individuals. The measure
also opens up the possibility for emergence of black markets for fraudulently
registered or stolen SIM cards, which can potentially become another problem on
the plate of the law enforcement agencies.[111]
Furthermore, the SIM or the handset can be physically given to another person
or stolen, so there is not way to ensure that the person who has committed a
crime is the person under whose name a phone number is registered. Finally, a
SIM registration requirement is jurisdictionally limited, so there is no way to
block foreign criminals who target a particular country operating a mandatory
registration requirement by using a phone in a country which does not have such
a requirement.[112]
The alternative approach to SIM registration is lawful interception of
communications which require phone operators to have capability in place to
monitor communications in real time and allow access to the enforcement
agencies when needed upon authorisation from the relevant authorities. This is
the approach the UK has adopted – the latest development in this regard was the
Interception of Communications Act 2016. In respect to cybercrime, the UK’s
approach is consistent with the requirements of Art. 21 Council of Europe
Cybercrime Convention,[113]
which empowers its signatory states to legislate and provide measures for
real-time collection and interception of content data, subject to the
conditions in Art. 15(1) which is that the measure is in accordance with the
ECHR. There is no provision in the Cybercrime Convention requiring states to
adopt linking of users’ registration to their national ID number.
2.2 Linking Users’
Registration with their National ID Number – The Sina Weibo Experience
China has a long history of attempting to introduce a
real-name policy on the Internet.[114]
The first attempts to do so were not effective as it was not possible to force
users to provide their national ID number retroactively, i.e. once they have
registered without it prior to the introduction of the measure.[115]
When the policy was introduced on Sina Weibo, this issue was dealt with by
disabling the comments functions of old users who refuse to register their
national ID number.[116]
The rationale behind the policy was to eradicate ‘bad speech’ on the Internet.
The deadline for the implementation of the registration through a national ID
number on Sina Weibo expired in March 2012, but the issues with implementing
the policy persisted after the deadline.[117]
The introduction of linking users’ registration with
their national ID number encountered a number of problems. Firstly, there was
resistance on behalf of social networking platforms such as Sina Weibo because
of the immense costs of implementing the policy and ensuring that users’ data
is kept secure, the administrative burden of verifying users’ registrations are
genuine[118]
and the negative impact on business as it leads to withdrawal of users.[119]
Moreover, it is possible to type any Chinese ID number upon registration, so
there is a big market for stolen or leaked ID numbers and no way to verify
whether the registration is accurate and genuine.[120]
After China denied market access to foreign social networking platforms such as
Facebook, this led to proliferation of local social media. The implementation
of the policy by the largest social networking platform – Sina Weibo, led to
migration of users to alternative platforms that do not run the policy and
thus, break the law.[121]
The remaining users found ways to circumvent the requirement by setting their
location to ‘overseas’ or through buying a SIM and using Sina Weibo through a
mobile network.[122]
There is a mandatory SIM card registration requirement in China, but the
sellers of mobile phones often fill in fake information.[123]
At the same time, there is little that the government can do to compel all
social media websites to implement the ID registration policy. The government has
interest in keeping all users on one or two platforms and then targeting these
with its policy. The market in China is fragmented after the withdrawal of
international social media, and therefore, users no longer use predominantly
one or two platforms.[124]
The government could close the infringing platforms, but it cannot prevent
setting up of new ones and fragmentation of the market.
3. The Potential of Introducing a Requirement to Link Users’ Registration to their National Identity Number in the UK
There are a number of reasons why requiring social
media websites to link users’ registration to their national ID number may have
positive impact on law enforcement in the UK.
3.1 Link between
Criminalisation and the Ability to Identify the Perpetrators of Crimes
The House of Lords Select Committee on Communications
report on the subject of social media and criminal offences rightly describes
the necessity for law enforcement agencies to be able to easily identify
criminals on social media – “there is little point in criminalising certain
behaviour and at the same time legitimately making that same behaviour
impossible to detect.”[125]
It is therefore proportionate to require website operators to establish the
identity of users before they can register an account.[126]
Subsequently though, according to the select committee report, users ought to
be allowed to use the social networking platform by using pseudonyms.[127]
3.2 Security, order and
less hidden interception of communications
There is some logic in this statement in light of the
security threats, the spread of ubiquitous surveillance, terrorist propaganda,
crime and organised crime on social media.[128]
In relation to real-name policies, a type of which is the requirement to link
users’ registration with their national ID number, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) has noted that such a measure improves behaviour on social
media, creates a more civil environment and has a preventive power over
stalking and harassment by introducing accountability for actions on social
media.[129]
Interestingly, the EFF has suggested that implementing the requirement will
reduce the need for lawful interception of communication, currently carried out
by a number of governments, including the UK.[130]
This is a consistent conclusion, given that as noted above, governments that do
not have a general national registry and centralised identification system
through a uniform identity document tend to rely on spying the Internet. The
issue of increased spying is one of the big public concerns in the UK. It could
be argued that if the introduction of ID registration on social media leads to
less spying on behalf of the government, the social media users will be more
willing to give up their personal information. This hypothesis, however, has
not been tested in practice. Hardly any conclusions in this regard could be
drawn from the Sina Weibo experience since government control of the Internet
in China is part of everyday life and there is no such public revolt against
the practice as in the case of the UK’s widespread interception of
communications.
3.3 Reducing the number
of accounts of under-aged persons and fake accounts
Millions of accounts on Facebook belong to children
who are under the minimum age for setting up a profile on the platform – 13
years.[131]
Introducing a requirement to link users’ registration with their ID number is a
way of introducing age verification at the gateway of social media websites and
dealing with the problem with under-aged users.[132]
Related to this point, social media networks are plagued by a problem with a
massive number of fake accounts.[133]
Requesting ID number upon registration will substantially reduce the amount of
fake accounts.
3.4 Reducing the cost
of and time for investigating and prosecuting crime on social media
As discussed in Chapter I,[134]
one of the challenges of policing and prosecuting crime on social media is the
immense human and financial resources that this requires and the time that it
takes. Having readily available means to identify the point of origin for most
crimes on social media will alleviate this problem to a great extent. This will
reduce the practice to rely on amateur detectives – technically savvy citizens
who engage in investigating crime without being aware of the official code of
practice for this activity and then forward the evidence to the police. Linking
users’ registration to their national ID number will also decrease the
distraction of the police with finding previously unavailable evidence for
minor crime and return its focus on serious crime and violence on social media.
3.5 Self-restraint
By introducing accountability for one’s actions, the
linking of users’ registration on social networking platforms with their
national ID number, has the potential for expanding the impact of law on
behaviour on social media. In Chapter I it was argued that the law has limited
impact on behaviour as behaviour is also influenced by the social norms, market
and the architecture of the environment.[135]
There are three ways in which law influences outcomes – acting under threat of
punishment (first-order enforcement), being subject to informal sanctions by
the society as a result of the law (second-order enforcement) and
internalisation of the law and avoidance of committing crimes due to the prospect
of guilt (third-order enforcement).[136]
The measure under discussion has the potential of reinforcing the third-order
enforcement as the criminals’ sense that they can act with impunity on social
media as it is difficult to identify them and attribute the criminal act to
them will be addressed.
SUMMARY: The current UK approach to regulating and
investigating crime and violence on social media is based on the assumption
that what is not an offence online ought not to be considered an offence
online. This is the so-called online-offline equivalence principle. However,
there are substantive differences in terms of scale, scope and degree of harm
between similar crimes in the physical world and on social media as
demonstrated by the example of cyberbullying. Furthermore, there are social
media-dependent crimes, which are not familiar to the criminal justice system.
These factors render the current UK legislation designed to deal with
traditional crime inadequate to address the specificity of crime on social
media. The proposal to require from social networking platforms to request
users’ national identity number upon registration is a departure from the
principle of online-offline equivalence. It was first introduced in the context
of mobile phones with the requirement for mandatory registration of SIM cards
in some states and social networks in China. In both cases, there have been
issues with enforcing the measure, mainly because users attempt to circumvent
it through various means. The measure has some limited potential to alleviate
the problems of regulation and investigation of crime on social media in the
UK. It can facilitate the attribution of criminal acts and thus, partially
curtail the activities of criminals. Furthermore, it has a real potential to
decrease the cost of and time spent on investigating crime on social media and
reduce the number of fake accounts and accounts belonging to under-aged minors.
Arguably, it could also improve third-order enforcement of the law through
self-restraint of criminals and reduce the need for hidden surveillance on
behalf of the government.
[1] House of Lords
Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media and criminal offences’, 1st
Report of Session 2014–15, HL Paper 37 (London, Stationery Office, 2014), para.
7
[2] Statista,
‘Forecast of Facebook user numbers in the United Kingdom (UK) from 2014 to 2021
(in million users)’, Statista (online)
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/553538/predicted-number-of-facebook-users-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/>
[3] Statista,
‘Number of Twitter users in the United Kingdom (UK) from 2012 to 2018 (in
million users)’, Statista (online)
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/271350/twitter-users-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/>
[4]
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media and criminal
offences’, para. 9
[5] Khan, U. ‘Juror
dismissed from a trial after using Facebook to help make a decision’, The Telegraph (online), 24 November 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/3510926/Juror-dismissed-from-a-trial-after-using-Facebook-to-help-make-a-decision.html>
[6] Ibid.
[7] HM
Attorney General v Davey [2013] EWHC 2317
[8] Ibid., para. 6
[9] Chapter 4
[10] Dodds, L.
‘’Tiger porn’ case: Can you do better than the CPS?’, The Telegraph (online), 28 October 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11193829/Tiger-porn-case-Can-you-do-better-than-the-CPS.html>
[11] Keep Calm Talk
Law, ‘The State of Extreme Law in the UK’, Keep
Calm Talk Law Legal Blog (online), 2 December 2014 <http://www.keepcalmtalklaw.co.uk/the-state-of-extreme-pornography-law-in-the-uk/>
[12] Press
Association, ‘Social media-related crime reports up 780% in four years’, The Guardian (online), 27 December 2012
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/dec/27/social-media-crime-facebook-twitter>
[13] Statista, ‘Daily
time spent on social networking by internet users worldwide from 2012 to 2016
(in minutes)’ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-social-media-usage-worldwide/>
[14] Ibid.
[15] Pelgrin, W. ‘3
reasons why criminals exploit social networks (and tips to avoid getting
scammed)’, CSO (online), 5 June 2013
<http://www.csoonline.com/article/2133563/social-engineering/3-reasons-why-criminals-exploit-social-networks–and-tips-to-avoid-getting-scamme.html>
[16] France, L.S.,
Verdier, C. ‘Kardashian heist: Police say social media made her a target’, CNN News (online), 5 October 2016 <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/04/entertainment/kim-kardashian-police-social-media/index.html>
[17] Wall, D. ‘The
Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’ (Version October 2015), in Information Technology and the Criminal
Justice System, edited by April Pattavina (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2005) 77,
pp. 80-81
[18] Armstrong, H.L.,
Forde, P.J. ‘Internet anonymity practices in computer crime’ [2003] 11(5) Information Management & Computer
Security 209, p. 211
[19] Tsesis, A.
‘Terrorist Speech on Social Media’ [2017] 70(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 651, p. 655
[20] Berger, J.M.
‘The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media’, Brookings (online), 27 January 2015 <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-evolution-of-terrorist-propaganda-the-paris-attack-and-social-media/>
[21] Pease, K. ‘Crime
futures and foresight: Challenging criminal behaviour in the information age’,
in Crime and the Internet: Cybercrimes
and Cyberfears, edited by David Wall (London, Routledge 2001) 18, p. 22
[22] Ibid.
[23] Curtis, C. Anti-Social Behaviour: A Multi-National
Perspective of the Everyday to the Extreme (London, Sage 2016), p. 69
[24] Evans, M.
‘Police facing rising tide of social media crimes’, The Telegraph (online), 5 June 2015 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11653092/Police-facing-rising-tide-of-social-media-crimes.html>
[25] Surette, R.
‘Performance Crime and Justice’ [2015] 27(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 195
[26] Surette, R. ‘How
social media is changing the way people commit crimes and police fight them’, LSE US Centre Blog (online) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/01/28/how-social-media-is-changing-the-way-people-commit-crimes-and-police-fight-them/>
[27] Wall, D. ‘The
Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’, p. 81
[28] Žižek, S. Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New
York, Picador, 2008)
[29] Recuero, R.
‘Social Media and Symbolic Violence’, Social
Media + Society 1 (April-June 2015), p. 1
[30] Boyd, D. ‘Social network sites as networked publics: Affordances, dynamics, and
implications’, in Networked
self: Identity, community, and
culture on social network sites, edited
by Zizi Papacharissi (New York, Routledge, 2011) 39, p. 45
[31] House of Lords
Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media and criminal offences’, 1st
Report of Session 2014–15, HL Paper 37 (London, Stationery Office, 2014), para.
9
[32] Ibid., para. 10
[33] Hörnle, J.
‘Countering the dangers of online pornography – Shrewd regulation of lewd
content’ [2011] 2(1) European Journal of
Law and Technology
[34] Adapted from
Wall, D. ‘The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity’, p. 81
[35] Ibid., pp. 80-81
[36] Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, Rome, 4 November 1950
[37] Strohecker, D.P.
‘The Crisis of Authenticity: Symbolic Violence, Memes, Identity’, Cyborgology (online), 23 March 2012.
<https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/03/23/the-crisis-of-authenticity-symbolic-violence-memes-identity/>
[38] R v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No. 4) [2004] EWCA Crim 631, para. 55
[39] R v Sheppard & Anor [2010] EWCA Crim 65, para. 24
[40] Brenner, S., Koops, B.J. ‘Approaches to
Cybercrime Jurisdiction’ [2004] 4(1) Journal
of High Technology Law 1, p. 10
[41] Kohl, U.
‘Barbarians in Our Midst: ‘Cultural Diversity’ on the Transnational Internet’ [2014]
5(1) European Journal of Law and
Technology
[42] Brenner, S., Koops, B.J. ‘Approaches to
Cybercrime Jurisdiction’, p. 6
[43] Hörnle, J.
‘Countering the dangers of online pornography’
[44] Crossley, L.
‘How police ‘ignore cybercrime’: Just one in 100 cases is investigated despite
the number of online fraud cases rocketing in recent years’, Daily Mail (online), 24 September 2015
< http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3247176/How-police-ignore-cybercrime-Just-one-100-cases-investigated-despite-number-online-fraud-cases-rocketing-recent-years.html>
[45] National Crime
Agency, ‘NCA Strategic
Cyber Industry Group Cyber Crime Assessment 2016’, Version 1.2,
7 July 2016. Available at <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/709-cyber-crime-assessment-2016/file>
[46] Wall, D.
‘Cybercrime, Media and Insecurity: The shaping of public perceptions of
cybercrime’ [2008] 22(1-2) International
Review of Law, Computers and Technology 45, p. 48
[47]
Ibid., p. 56
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., p. 57
[50] McGovern. A.,
Milivojevic, S. ‘Social media and crime: the good, the bad and the ugly’, The Conversation (online), 16 October
2016 < https://theconversation.com/social-media-and-crime-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-66397>
[51] Pelley, V. ‘Who
done it? Citizen investigators mine social media for crime clues’, Aljazeera America (online). 7 June 2014
< http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/7/citizen-crime-sleuths.html>
[52] Lessig, L. ‘The
Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach?’ [1999]113 Harvard Law Review 501, pp. 506-509
[53] Lessig, L. Code version 2.0 (New York, Basic Books, 2006), p. 123
[54] Scott, R. ‘The
Limits of Behavioural Theories of Law and Social Norms’ [2000] 86(8) Virginia Law Review 1603
[55] Lessig, L. Code version 2.0, p. 340
[56] Wang, F.Y., Zeng, D., Hendler, J.,
Zhang, Q., Feng, Z., Gao, Y., Wang, H., Lai, G. ‘A Study of the Human Flesh
Search Engine: Crowd-Powered Expansion of Online Knowledge’ [2010] 43(8) Computer 45, p. 45
[57] Ibid., p. 341
[58] Plessis, A.The
Rise and
Fall of
the
SecondEmpire:
1852–1871, translated by Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 121
[59] Wall, D. ‘Cybercrime,
Media and Insecurity’, p. 57
[60] Ibid.
[61] Investigatory
Powers Act 2016, Chapter 25
[62] Suter, L.
‘Taxman unleashes its ‘snooper computer’: what information does its have on
you?’, The Telegraph (online), 7
January 2017 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tax/return/taxman-unleashes-snooper-computer-information-does-have/>
[63] Brenner, S. ‘At
Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/terrorism/warfare’ [2007]
97(2) Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 379, p. 405
[64] Brenner, S. ‘Toward
a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security’ [2004] 10(2) Boston University Journal of Science and
Technology Law, pp. 49-59
[65] House of Lords
Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media and criminal offences’, para.
51
[66] Ibid., para. 52
[67] Harkin, G.
‘Tragic Erin named Ask.fm in suicide note, claims mother’, Independent Ireland (online), 14 August 2013 < http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/tragic-erin-named-askfm-in-suicide-note-claims-mother-29497140.html>
[68] Defamation Act
2013, Chapter 26
[69] The Defamation (Operators of Websites)
Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3028
[70] Brenner, S. ‘At
Light Speed’, p. 407
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., pp.
409-410
[73] Brenner, S., Schwerha IV, J. ‘Transnational Evidence Gathering and
Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime’ [2002] 20(3) Journal of Computer and Information Law
347, p. 354
[74] Brenner, S. ‘At
Light Speed’, p. 414
[75] Ibid., p.
415-416
[76] House of Lords
Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media and criminal offences’, para.
32
[77] Ibid., p. 5
[78] Crown
Prosecution Service, ‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications
sent via social media’ (October 2016) < http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/>
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid., under
Category 4
[81] Simplified and
adapted from House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, ‘Social media
and criminal offences’, pp. 30-31
[82] Chapter 49
[83] Chapter 34
[84] Chapter 100
[85] Chapter 40
[86] Chapter 21
[87] Chapter 27
[88] Chapter 37
[89] Chapter 44
[90] Reed, C. ‘Online and Offline Equivalence:
Aspiration and Achievement’ [2010]18(3) International Journal of
Law and Information Technology 248, p. 248
[91] Ibid., p. 251
[92] Patchin, J..
Hinduja, S. ‘Bullies Move beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look at
Cyberbullying’ [2006] 4(2) Youth Violence
and Juvenile Justice 148, p. 152
[93] Dodds, C. ‘How
is Cyberbullying Different from ‘Traditional’ Bullying?’, Cybersmile Foundation (online), 4 September 2014 <https://www.cybersmile.org/blog/how-is-cyberbullying-different-from-traditional-bullying>
[94] Patchin, J..
Hinduja, S. ‘Bullies Move beyond the Schoolyard’, p. 155
[95] Ibid., p. 155
[96] Dodds, C. ‘How
is Cyberbullying Different from ‘Traditional’ Bullying?’
[97] Fingas, J.
‘Facebook Live death highlights the risks of livestreaming’, Engadget UK (online) <https://www.engadget.com/2016/06/18/man-records-own-death-on-facebook-live/>
[98] GSM Association
(GSMA), ‘Mandatory ‘Real Name’ Registration by Prepaid SIM Card Users:
Consideration for Policymakers’, GSMA
Blog (online), 24 May 2016 < http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/blog/mandatory-real-name-registration-prepaid-sim-card-users-considerations-policymakers/>
[99] Ibid.
[100] Chin, J. ‘China
Is Requiring People to Register Real Names for Some Internet Services’, Wall Street Journal (online), 4 February
2015 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-enforce-real-name-registration-for-internet-users-1423033973>
[101] Caragliano, D.
‘Why China’s ‘Real Name’ Internet Policy Doesn’t Work’, The Atlantic (online), 26 March 2013 <https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/why-chinas-real-name-internet-policy-doesnt-work/274373/>
[102] GSM Association,
‘Mandatory registration of prepaid SIM cards: Addressing Challenges through
Best Practice’ (Report, April 2016) <http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/GSMA2016_Report_MandatoryRegistrationOfPrepaidSIMCards.pdf>,
p. 4
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] GSM Association,
‘Mandatory registration of prepaid SIM cards: Addressing Challenges’
[106] Ibid., p. 8
[107] Identity Cards
Act 2006, Chapter 15
[108] Ibid., s. 1
[109] GSM Association,
‘Mandatory registration of prepaid SIM cards: Addressing Challenges’, p. 9
[110] Ibid., p. 13
[111] GSM Association,
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[112] GSM Association,
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[113] Convention on
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[114] Bischoff, P. ‘A
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[115] Custer, C. ‘Lax
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[116] Caragliano, D.
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[117] Custer, C. ‘Lax
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[118] Caragliano, D.
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[119] Shu, C. ‘China
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[120] Custer, C.
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[121] Hatton, C. ‘Is
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[122] Custer, C. ‘How
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[123] Ibid.
[124] Caragliano, D.
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[125] House of Lords
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[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Edwards, L.,
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<http://www.cs.nott.ac.uk/~pszdrm/papers/2013_NamesHavePower%20paris%20vn.pdf>,
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[129] York, C. ‘A Case
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[130] Ibid.
[131] Yonkers, ‘CR
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[132] Horn, L. ‘7.5
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<
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[133] Parsons, J.
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BBC News, ‘Massive networks of fake accounts found on
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<
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[134] See para. 3.2
[135] See para. 3.3
[136] Ibid.