Question:
Discuss About The Australian Journal Of Emergency Management?
The event of the black Saturday bushfires is, to date, one of the biggest recorded disaster in the state of Victoria. It was a series of fires that started in January 2009 with the biggest bushfire disaster happening on the 7th of February. It was responsible for the deaths of 171 people and the destruction on 2006 homes throughout the state.
Though the ignition of the fires is still thought to be arson, no party has been identified as having orchestrated the event and as such, it has been considered and treated as a natural disaster. The Victorian Royal Commission was tasked with the management of preparing a final report in order to identify probable causes and also help generate a network of solutions in case of an emergency in the future.
While a suspicion remains that the fires started as a results of arson, it is also attributable to the climatic conditions of the area where a heat wave had provided a surge in temperatures.
From the house loss survey, it is evident that not much planning had been done prior to the fires to provide for a preventive solution. The state government, people and nation as a whole had been using policies that, while effective in dealing with smaller fires, could not be implemented on a fire event of the magnitude of the Black Saturday fires. Numerous houses and property that were lost could have been salvaged or saved had effective planning been done. It was noted, however, that the disaster management operations by both the government and non-governmental organizations were exemplary and it is because of them that a large portion of the affected areas survived (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, 2010).
National Level: At a national level, planning activities for the eventualities of a fire disaster were misplaced as suggested by Denis O’Bryan in his paper “House loss rate in a severe bushfire.” He goes on to clarify that, following a paper by Ahern and Chladil written in 1999 in response to a similar bushfire crisis, it was suggested that close proximity to vegetation is directly proportional to the chance of a residential structures being consumed the same fire (Ahern and Chladil, 1999). O’Bryan in his paper called it out as a policy based on misquoted text (O’Bryan, 2014).
It was noted that the correlation between proximity to vegetation, trees and presence of trees, proximity of combustible materials to the house or other vegetation in the compound, and the damage to houses and property was totally financial as both affected and unaffected houses had similar statistical values. It is further suggested that, rather than distance between vegetation and trees, the relevant authorities should have concentrated on distance from the ember source as the primary parameter for prevention of damage to residential property by the fires (O’Bryan, 2014).
State and Territory Level: Both O’Bryan’s paper and the commission’s report indicate that there were inadequate regulatory policies for the prevention of the bushfires. The commission’s report indicate that the preparatory advice given by the County Fire Authority (CFA) was also not sufficient to help residents plan well in order to prevent fire damage to homes. This is indicated by the fact that 24% of houses that were prepared in compliance to the CFA advice were still either damaged or destroyed with casualties and fatalities still being reported in these incidents (O’Bryan, 2014).
The government taskforce’s research also indicated that some residents were caught up in the fire because no timely information about it had been given and only noticed when it was too late. A large number of the people interviewed report having gotten the information about the fire and its whereabouts from friends and family who had either been affected themselves or had gotten the information from some other source. It has been reported that, while most radio and television stations talked about the fire, they did not air warning messages in good time. This and other sources indicate that a majority of the residents who got an evacuation message either via radio or via some other means only got it when it was too late to do anything but escape immediately (Booth et al., 2015).
This indicates a flaw in the disaster communication system, an observation which was also made later by the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry after the 2011 Brisbane flooding (Insurance Council of Australia, 2011). While the government cannot entirely be blamed for untimely information, it raises a few eyebrows when the lack of it may have been directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of 171 people. The following graph shows the disasters that have occurred in Melbourne over the last century and their location
Individual/ Household Level: Another thing learnt from the house loss survey is the ineffectiveness of the ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ strategy. This is because, as seen in the overall demographics, a majority of the people who died, died in their homes. Some died in their yards abut as seen in the reports and data presentation, most people who died did so trying to defend their homes. The policy advises to either leave early or stay behind and prepare well for the fire. This advice may have been effective in a different scenario but with the poor communication in this particular case, most people did not have time to adequately prepare for the fires (McLennan et al., 2012).
While some people were unprepared because of lack of enough time due to poor communication, some were unprepared because they did not see the need to. This is evidenced in the report when 4 out of every 5 people interviewed who were unprepared for the fires acknowledge that they did not see the need to. This has raised questions about the state and national government’s role in nursing proper bushfire preparedness. For a state that had experienced a similar disaster but of a slightly lesser magnitude back in 1999, it would be expected that they would have had preparatory measures at least when the first fires broke out. However, it can be noted that a large factor contributing to how the people reacted was an assumptive attitude that sought to play down the threat until it was too late (O’Bryan, 2014).
Among the conditions that gave rise to these losses are the poor advisories and regulations. This is evidenced above by the fact that CFA advisories on preparedness still did not help preserve the buildings affected by the fires. Another example is given where 12% of houses that were destroyed or damaged were compliant with either AS 3959 while another 14% were compliant with WMO regulations. The compliance to those regulations seemingly made no difference to the preservation of the houses and property. This shows a fault in the regulatory measures put in place as they were not effective at the time (O’Bryan, 2014).
Another condition that provided for the losses was the attitude of the people on the wake of the disaster. A majority of the people who had not prepared their houses for disasters are noted to have not done so because they saw no need to. While it can be argued that the bushfires caught the nation by surprise, it is also a wonder that people living in areas with bushes would not put up the right measures in order to put up a formidable defense. While this condition is not attributable to the loss of property, it cannot be attributable to the loss of life (Hayes et al., 2010)
Another condition that proved to contribute to the loss of houses and other effects is the lack of proper communication. As the reports indicate a very late warning alert form the radio stations, it is assumable is that poor condition did serve as a condition for the overall fire effect. In the past, proper communication has helped people going through a natural disaster similar to the one in this case. It is therefore possible to assume that it would have a similar effect on the population in question. Poor communication in this case includes with television and radio (Attiwill and Adams, 2013).
Among the contributions of the Victorian Royal Commission Final Report, the biggest is the identification of the sources and possible causes of bushfires and how they spread. Despite having experienced a similar tragedy of less magnitude back in 1999, the data, having been compared has shown some consistency ruling out the coincidences and unverified information. The repetitive data was compiled both by the state’s commission and independent parties either consulted by the state or publishing their work online. With this information, further preparation plans can be drawn and better preparation methods can be achieved. The information here provides a reference point in case of any planning activities (O’Neil and Handmer, 2012).
The report indicated that a lot of policies and regulations that were in place then had been either ineffective or not implemented well enough. One of the best examples of this is the fact that 24 out of 26 houses burnt up completely were located in Marysville, a region that has had strict building codes. The building codes, having been highly prioritizing, must have given a false sense of preparedness leading to many losing their lives and property. This report has therefore contributed to the body of knowledge about bushfires and the then method of preparedness in case of further study.
The report released also highlighted the need for further research on bushfires. It provided a starting point offering statistical data both for the affected regions, property and individuals and the mode of both ignition and spread. It is with this in mind that researchers have been able to recommend solutions for the unpreparedness. The report’s contribution to the research sector, while not entirely exhaustive has also helped study the human behaviour in a hid to provide for better interventions in the future. Further researches and comparisons have been done and a database created allowing for accurate and timely information management (O’Neill and Handmer, 2012).
The report, in highlighting the behavioural tendencies of the people, also contributed to identifying possible places and centers of mass relief. When the fires broke out and people ran, a majority of them, as indicated in the report, admitted to running to public spaces e.g. schools, parks, hospitals, police stations and churches. These places, at the time, seemed more secure than their homes. Having observed this, we can say that the report contributed to disaster management of recurrent and similar crises. While this is different from personal preparedness, disaster management goes a long way in mitigating the effects of the disasters and helping the people affected deal with the aftermath of it all (Hughes and Mercer, 2009).
Conclusion:
It is noteworthy that, aside from a few regulations that have been incorporated to enable the government to mitigate the effect of the fire, that no lasting solution has since been established. With this in mind, it is also noteworthy that fire preparation is important both by the individual or house hold, or the regional authority. As such, further research is still needed on this field in order to improve the chances of both human and property survival (Ladds et al., 2011)
References
Ahern, A., and Chladil, M., 1999. How far do bushfires penetrate urban areas? In Bushfire 99 Australian Bushfire Conference, Albury.
Attiwill, P. M., & Adams, M. A. (2013). management, inquiries and politics in the eucalypt forests of Victoria, south-eastern Australia. Forest Ecology and Management, 294, 45-53.
Booth, K., Tranter, B., & Eriksen, C. (2015). Properties under fire: why so many Australians are inadequately insured against disaster.
Handmer, J., & Tibbits, A. (2005). Is staying at home the safest option during bushfires? Historical evidence for an Australian approach. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environmental Hazards, 6(2), 81-91.
Haynes, K., Handmer, J., McAneney, J., Tibbits, A., & Coates, L. (2010). Australian bushfire fatalities 1900–2008: exploring trends in relation to the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy. Environmental science & policy, 13(3), 185-194.
Hughes, R., & Mercer, D. (2009). Planning to reduce risk: the wildfire management overlay in Victoria, Australia. Geographical Research, 47(2), 124-141.
Insurance Council of Australia. (2011). Flooding in the Brisbane River Catchment, January 2011. Sydney: ICA Hydrology Panel.
Ladds, M., Handmer, J., & Magee, L. (2017). A pragmatic approach to improving Australian disaster data.
McLennan, J., Elliott, G., & Omodei, M. (2012). Householder decision-making under imminent wildfire threat: stay and defend or leave?. International Journal of Wildland Fire, 21(7), 915-925.
O’Neill, S. J., & Handmer, J. (2012). Responding to bushfire risk: the need for transformative auditing. Environmental Research Letters, 7(1), 014018.
O’Bryan, D. (2014). House loss rate in a severe bushfire. Melbourne, Victoria: Published by Red Eagle Bushfire Protection Services.
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry. (2012). Final Report. Queensland: Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry.
Stephens, S. L., Adams, M. A., Handmer, J., Kearns, F. R., Leicester, B., Leonard, J., & Moritz, M. A. (2009). Urban–wildland fires: how California and other regions of the US can learn from Australia. Environmental Research Letters, 4(1), 014010.
Tibbits, A., Handmer, J., Haynes, K., Lowe, T., & Whittaker, J. (2008). Prepare, stay and defend or leave early. Community Bushfire Safety’.(Eds J Handmer, K Haynes) pp, 59-71.
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. (2010). Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report. Publisher Parliament of Victoria, Australia.
Whittaker, J., & Handmer, J. (2010). Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black Saturday research. Australian Journal of Emergency Business-law, The, 25(4), 7.
Whittaker, J., Haynes, K., Handmer, J., & McLennan, J. (2013). Community safety during the 2009 Australian ‘Black Saturday’bushfires: an analysis of household preparedness and response. International journal of wildland fire, 22(6), 841-849.
Whittaker, J., & Mercer, D. (2004). The Victorian bushfires of 2002–03 and the politics of blame: a discourse analysis. Australian Geographer, 35(3), 259-287
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