Discuss about the Volkswagen Diesel Emission Scandal.
The events surrounding the Volkswagen (VW) emissions scandal began in September 2015 after the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) served a notice regarding the company’s violation of the Clean Air Act 1963 (Bovens 2016). Basically, VW was accused of intentionally violating environmental laws by programming its turbocharged direct injection engines (TDI) to reveal low Nitrogen oxide (NOx) gas during laboratory tests yet the vehicles released nearly 40 times the NOx in real life driving. According to reports by Schmidt (2016), the company installed the ‘cheating’ software in nearly 11,000,000 cars worldwide in the years of 2009 to 2015 while only 500,000 of the cares were installed with the software in the United States. Before the 2015 revelation, EPA in conjunction with California Air Resources Board (CARB) had commissioned a study in 2014 to investigate the emission discrepancies between the VW US models and the European models by summing up results from studies conducted by three different agencies on 15 vehicles (Iovenko 2016). According to the author, the agencies, one of them being the West Virginia University, detected high NOx emissions in three VW cars during the live road test. Subsequently, according to Dearden (2016), the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) was intrigued to purchase some other data from two other sources which were later merged with the live road test data to produce a strong evidence of emissions cheating.
This report aims to give a detailed analysis of the VW scandal and the ethical issues around it. First, the report will give a background of the fuel emission scandal by delving into the diesel emission standards and how they compare around the world. The second part of the report will highlight the participants in the scandal and how the ‘cheating’ idea was crafted. Thirdly, there will be a detailed analysis of the possible reasons why VW could have decided to develop the cheating program. The penultimate section of this report will highlight the impacts of the rigging to the organization and to its stakeholders. Ultimately, there will be an identification of the solutions that emerged after the scandal; before making conclusions and recommendations.
Environmental conservation and sustainability have recently gained much attention from nations in the recent past. Likewise, according to Whiteman & Hoster (2015), global environmental protection agencies have increased their consideration of natural phenomena such as environmental pollution and globalization. A typical agency that that has in the recent past tightened its environmental protection watch is the EPA, which has increased its control on emanating from vehicle emissions (Elson et al 2017). In fact, according to Jung & Alison (2017), EPA’s mission of controlling vehicle-related environmental pollution began in the 1970s when the company started announcing more restrictions on emissions standards of light-duty vehicles such as sport-utility cars and small pickups. Observably, the most stringent requirements were introduced in 2004 when all car models were required to improve their fuel emission standards (Elson et al 2015). According to Teagarden (2017), EPA’s fuel emission control has also been supported by the US federal agency, a collaboration that aimed to reduce vehicle nitrogen oxide emissions from 1.25 grams per mile to 0.07 grams per mile. This collaboration has largely been seen as an effort to save humans from the toxicity of nitrogen oxide which has largely been associated with human health complications such as bronchitis, cardiovascular disease, respiratory complications, asthma and premature death (Katz-Rosene 2015).
EPA’s new emissions standards was a major challenge to auto-manufacturers especially those who manufactured fuel efficient diesel cars in the United States like VW, Honda, Nissan and Mazda (Coglianese & Nash 2017). However, while a majority of the market players had to bear the cost of this regulatory compliance, managers at VW thought otherwise.
In a surprising turn of events, VW was announced to be a ‘diesel dupe’ in 2015 for rigging an emission test meant to reduce the amount of pollution emitted by diesel-consuming vehicles. While announcing the scandal, EPA noted that VW’s main aim was to pretend that its vehicles met the fuel emissions standards while in the real sense; it was producing above-board diesel emissions (Bird 2015). Basically, according to Patra (2016), the software was designed in a manner that it detected when the TDI engines were under test and transmitted information to the vehicle’s various parts including the breaks, steering, and accelerator to make changes within the engine. The changes could then trigger a diminution of nitrogen oxide emission levels (Patra 2016).
Widely reported in the media, the events surrounding the VW scandal has received many speculations from the public as to what factors created a ground for the scandal as well as who was involved. Initially, it was reported that 9 managers had been suspended for participating in the cheating. Similarly, according to Rogerson (2018), the media reported that the company’s chairman attributed the scandal to a routine failure of some of the company’s department to fail to comply with the rules.
In September 2015, the company’s CEO told the US lawmakers that only a small group of the company’s software developers participated in developing the software and embedding it on the cars. However, according to Piazza & Jourdan (2018), the CEO was keen to mention his unawareness of the exact number of engineers who participated in the scandal and that it was not a corporate decision to cheat. In an interesting turn of events, a law firm (Jones Day) conducted an internal investigation and found that 50 members of the staff especially those based in Wolfsburg were well aware of the cheating plans.
Afterward, the media learned that although some VW technicians and engineers had informed their supervisors about the scandal back in 2011 the supervisors ignored the reports (Silvia 2018). In the eleventh month of 2015, according to Carberry et al (2018), a dramatic number of managers, engineers, and technicians who participated in the scandal emerged. Since then, multiple theories have emerged of how the cheating was conducted; one describing that a program could be designed by one individual but installing it in the cars required multiple numbers of a coordinated workforce (Cavico & Mujtaba 2017). Furthermore, according to Cavico & Mujtaba (2017), it was finally established that employees in the junior positions were not involved in the scandal, but a large number of staffs in the managerial and mid-managerial positions participated. As a result, nine managers from quality control, supervisory board, plant control, engine designers and managers of sub-companies such as Audi and Porsche were suspended. It is worth noting that the cheating device was added in several millions of codes to defeat EPA’s 100 million codes of detection, to mean that an external/third-party programmer might have been involved in writing the code (Coglianese & Nash 2017).
Before resigning in September 2015, VW CEO Martin Winterkorn made it clear that he was not aware of the company’s engagement in the scandal. Nonetheless, according to Grover & Hasel (2015), Ping & Chen-Bo (2017) and Ferriera (2016), it is greatly believed that technological shortcomings were the most likely reason for the company’s decision to cheat in the emission test. Moreover, the company’s chairman made an announcement in December 2015 that the company had attempted the same technique in 2005 when EPA introduced the most stringent fuel emission compliance rules, and that they were forced to engage in cheating due to technological shortcoming (Woodhouse 2016). According to the Chairman’s narrations, the company engineers were unable to comply with the rules within the time frame and that the company’s available resources were inadequate to activate the compliance (Whiteman & Hoster 2015). The authors note further that despite a team of VW Spanish engineers finding a solution to the problem, it still chose to implement the rigging idea. Hence, from the previous chairman’s statement, VW’s 2015 engagement in emission test cheating was not a one-off mistake but rather a culmination of a series of uninterrupted mistakes.
Another major contributor to the company’s engagement in the cheating scandal is its corporate culture. The company is had a compliance-based culture where employees must comply with organizational rules and must work under a critically centralized command (Auletto & Miller 2017). The authors write further that this culture holds that expectations and demands of the company must be met regardless of how employees perform to meet such expectations, and therefore employees are susceptible to doing anything, however unethical it may be, to comply with the corporate culture. The company’s culture, as observed by Veschoor (2016), is different from that of other automobiles because rather than being democratic, all the management systems are autocratic, a phenomenon that contributes to a paucity of global thinking in all its activities (Bovens 2016). Even if the key managers did not enforce the workers to develop the cheat device, the working environment might have played a big role in encouraging it because working at VW means avoiding discussion and dissent (Elson et al 2017).
The human resource practices in VW encourages managers to tell employees to consider tasks, and if they are not capable of doing so, someone else with better capabilities will come and do it. Therefore, according to Katz-Rosene (2015), VW employees find themselves in a situation where they can do anything to keep their jobs.
According to the assertions of a VW employee, employees may prefer engaging in such unethical acts due to the company’s rewarding system (Roulet & Clemente 2018). The authors say that employees at VW are exposed to a bonus system that runs from the lower ranks to the higher ranks and is based on individual performance. This means that employees, as well as teams, receive bonuses based on their performance and productivity, and therefore even if one would want to give a dissenting opinion on an unethical practice that improved their productivity, they would not do so for the sake of other team members (Hupp et al 2018).
When the company publicly admitted having engaged in the scandal, its human resource manager, Bernd Osterloh claimed that the company’s approaches and culture were unethical, inappropriate and needed drastic value-based changes to give employees the freedom to share their dissent opinions (Bowman 2017). Clearly, this supports the proposition that the company’s corporate culture could have created an atmosphere of engagement in the unethical practice. While some commentators might stick to the idea that the emission test cheating was motivated by profit maximization, this idea might be a misconception. According to Coffee (2017), it is clear that this scandal traces its roots to the company’s approaches and culture.
In 2014, the only car manufacturing company that was ahead of VW in terms of market capitalization was Toyota. However, it is speculated that when the company publicly admitted its participation in the emission scandal, its position as world’s second largest car manufacturer was shaken by the financial burden that ensued thereafter (Bovens 2016). According to Jung & Alison (2017), the company had to contract three public relations companies to deal with the crisis. Moreover, according to the authors, the company hired former BMW communications director to help deal with the public relations issues that accompanied the scandal, at a salary of $22,000 per month. The company also had to deal with various issues of international relations since the case included several countries (Bovens 2016). However, the following are several other impacts that the scandal had on the company:
Research estimates that by the end of 2016, the cars that were ratified based on the defeat device had produced additional emissions that triggered a premature death of close to 60 people in the United States (Iovenko 2016). Nonetheless, from 2008 to 2015, VW and Audi cars are estimated to have produced 40 times more nitrogen oxide than is allowed by the country’s Clean Air Act. According to Dearden (2016), this translates to a 6 years emission of an estimated 3.67 million kg of nitrogen oxide to the environment.
Patra (2016) write Nitrogen oxide is the primary element of smog and particulate matter which expose humans to diseases such as asthma, bronchitis, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Similarly, according to research by Whiteman & Hoster (2015), Piazza & Jourdan (2018) and Jung & Alison (2017), nitrogen oxide produced by VW vehicles is responsible for endangering 60 human lives by causing 10 to 20 years of premature death.
Rogerson (2018) mentions that scientists have also estimated that VW nitrogen oxide emissions have directly contributed to an estimated 31 cases of bronchitis and 34 cases of respiratory disease within the US since 2015. The author also claims that the environmental pollution emanating 2008 to 2015 emissions cause the US $450 million worth of health related expenses. Piazza & Jourdan (2018) aver that a decline to recall all the affected vehicles would lead to 140 premature deaths from 2015 onwards. Moreover, according to the authors, failure to recall the cars would cause $840 million worth of health costs. Finally, Teagarden (2017), Patra (2016) and Rogerson (2018) claim that the excess nitrogen oxide emitted by the affected VW cars can lead to acid rains which have an impact on human health, nature and natural resources.
VW’s workforce was the most affected by the scandal. When the company publicly admitted having participated in the scandal, its sales revenue declined. As a result, according to Piazza & Jourdan (2018), the company had to reduce the bonus of all chief management staff in order to cope with the situation. This was part of the plan to adopt a comprehensive solution that would ensure fairness for all the parties that participated. The bonus reduction which targeted a group of executives as well as the management board led to a significant diminution of all the company’s salary payment. However, according to Jung & Alison (2017), it is worth noting that the bonus cut majorly affected the company’s executives operating the US division and not its Germany division.
While the scandal affected all members of the VW including Audi and Skoda, the sales decline experienced by the Volkswagen brand was more substantial than that experienced by the other brands. According to Whiteman & Hoster (2015), the scandal contributed to a damage of the VW brand image which saw most customers shifting to other competitor brands such as Mercedes Benz and Toyota – this contributed to a sales decline. In fact, according to Teagarden (2017), the company experienced a sales decline for the first time in 11 years. The following figure illustrates the sales decline experienced by VW as a result of the scandal:
Interestingly, the Australian VW market did not get a hit as a result of the scandal. In fact, according to Patra (2016), there was a 10% increase in sales of the car brand within Australia as reported by the country’s Chamber of Automotive Industries. Other brands related to VW such as Skoda and Audi saw an increase in sales from 19,000 units to 23,000 units in 2014 and 2015 respectively for Audi and 4000 to 5000 in 2014 and 2015 respectively for Skoda (Bovens 2016). Teagarden (2017) attributes the scandal’s low impact on the Australian VW market to the insignificant number of VW diesel vehicles. The author says that there are more VW petrol cars in Australia than the diesel model, and therefore the scandal did not have a huge impact on the market.
The company’s share price was not spared too. According to Dearden (2016), the ethical issues that surrounded the scandal had an effect on the company’s share price one week immediately after the scandal was revealed. The author observes that the company’s value per share dropped by one third, an occurrence that led to a loss of millions of dollars of the company’s value. The following figure gives a graphical depiction of the scandal’s effects on the company’s share value:
The scandal’s damage on public image VW dealers triggered the company to come up with various measures that would cushion its dealers from the effect. According to Whiteman & Hoster (2015), the company came up with specific programs meant to help them cope with the situation including specific amounts of money and sales incentives. The initiative was a response to the decline in profits and sales revenue experienced by VW dealership network, especially after the sales of all VW diesel cars were stopped as the investigation was ongoing (Bovens 2016). In October 2015, the company’s American division distributed money to all its dealers within the US in response to the effects that the scandal had on their sales and profit. Patra (2016) explain that each dealer received the grant depending on their volume of distribution and the highest amount given to a dollar totaled to $10,000.
Despite concerns raised by some dealer over the inadequacy of the fund, Jung & Alison (2017) report that most dealers were able to cover for the loss they made. Teagarden (2017) mentions a specific dealer, Steve Kalafer from New Jersey, who reported to have used the fund to expand the business’ marketing budget and boost its operating cost. Hence, it can be extrapolated that the company’s dealership network was greatly affected.
In April 2016, a Californian court declared that VW in collaboration with US environmental control agencies and other government agencies had established all the necessary measures to finalize the scandal which saw almost 600,000 VW vehicles in the US fitted with the emission test cheating device (Iovenko 2016). Therefore, the agreement would principally apply to VW in the United States, with a proposal to all the affected VW customers that they could either sell back their cars to the company (all loans canceled if the car was bought on loan) or fix the cars by removing the cheat device. According to Dearden (2016), these options included a considerable amount of compensation to the 2-liter diesel car owners and a remediation of any harm caused by the emissions. While the mediation for compensation of the three-liter car owners was still underway, the proposed agreement over two-liter vehicles was approved by the Californian regulators, The US Department of Justice, and the Californian Attorney General’s office (Elson et al 2017).
The Federal Trade Commission (TFC) also accepted the company’s resolution to end the scandal. However, according to Teagarden (2017), the proposed agreement still required more approvals from other relevant agencies including a chance for the company to prove its commitment to developing green technology cars in the near future. Nonetheless, according to Whiteman & Hoster (2015), the deal also included seven billion dollar worth of expenditure set aside by the company to buy back the affected vehicles, which was part of the estimated 6.7 million euros to be spent by the company to bring back normalcy.
According to Dearden (2016), the company was also penalized a large amount of money for having engaged in the deception, a punishment which was proposed to be in the form of advancing traditional technology on environmental conservation (green punishment). The author writes further that this was an opportunity to improve the environmental impacts of the automobile industry by encouraging VW to consider manufacturing electric cars. Moreover, because it was not guaranteed that the company would fix the affected vehicles and that the car owners would decline to present their cars for fixing in fear of poor performance, a responsibility was bestowed on EPA to ensure that all the affected vehicles were recalled and fixed (Bovens 2016).
The proposal to have VW engage in the creation of electric/zero emission cars has been praised as a win-win situation for most stakeholders in the deal. According to Patra (2016), zero emission cars would mean that EPA could no longer need to create new, expensive and complicated car emission tests. Similarly, the environmentalists would be saved from keeping an eye on the company because it shall now be producing zero-emission cars (Iovenko 2016).
Rogerson (2018) and Teagarden (2017) claim that zero-emission cars are known for extremely less environmental impacts and therefore if VW manufactures more electric cars, it shall have compensated for the emissions created by the cheating device-fitted cars. The cars would also benefit the economy by increasing demand for car batteries, meaning more battery manufacturing companies may come up (Bovens 2016). Consequently, according to the author, a substantial amount of jobs will be created within the US and other affected areas. Commentaries by Whiteman & Hoster (2015), Dearden (2016) and Piazza & Jourdan (2018) also inform that developing electric cars would be an opportunity for the company to strengthen its market position and gain back its reputation despite the significant amount of investment it may require. It was perceived that the proposed electric car would be a good way of repurposing the penalized money and putting a rest to the scandal.
Conclusion and Implications for Business Management
It is evident that this scandal traces its roots to the business structure and culture within VW as a company. It should be noted that the 21st-century business models are far much better and the maintenance of a compliance-based business culture and model would be viewed by most commentators as archaic and unreasonable. According to Jung & Alison (2017), it exposes employees to a lot of ethical dilemmas making them prone to unethical decisions. Companies must acknowledge that employees’ actions are major determinants of a business’ success or failure, and therefore they should be able to have a working environment where they can develop moral standards and complete tasks in an ethical manner.
When a company adopts a value-based system of management, little consideration is given to organizational hierarchy and employees are left to work with their teams to complete tasks (Bovens 2016). Equally, according to Dearden (2016), the adoption of a value-based approach to management paves way for democracy and business ethics so much so that the company executives can voice their complaints or share ideas with their seniors to promote the company’s productivity while maintaining high standards of ethics.
There are various implications of this scandal on the practice of transport-related emission control within Australia. Just like EPA of the US seems more active in controlling vehicle fuel emissions, Australian regulatory agencies such as the National Transport Commission has a responsibility of stepping up its watchdog role and unearthing any unethical practices that some of the companies within Australia may be practicing. The VW scandal also implies that the environmental regulatory bodies in Australia must begin to establish more stringent rules for both the automobile and the manufacturing sector so that they become more conscious about the environment. In doing so, the agencies should provide relevant support including policy development and R&D aids aimed at encouraging better environmentally conscious practices across the industries.
In conclusion, this report has found that the VW diesel emission scandal was an overwhelmingly complicated case which created a lot of hassles for the company’s internal and external stakeholders. While the company engaged in serious unethical issues through this scandal, the resolution to offer green punishment to the company somehow appears to be a wise idea because it may turn the disgrace into a benefit for the society. Scholars have praised electric cars for being highly environmentally friendly and of economic value to the entire society. Furthermore, the adoption of electric cars would save environmental protection agencies from numerous regulations and checks in search of any environmental threats created by the vehicles. The agencies will be able to save time and costs in finding new ways detecting emissions.
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